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I. INTRODUCTION

Shock waves rippled through America in May 1992 when the verdict in
People v. Powell,3 better known as the "Rodney King" case, acquitted four Los
Angeles police officers of brutality, and sparked the Los Angeles riots. 4 The

1

Professor of Criminal Justice, Wayne State University. B.A., Cornell University
(1963); J.D., Brooklyn Law School (1966); M.A., Ph.D., State University of New York at
Albany (1971, 1977).
2
3

Law student, Wayne State University. B.S., Wayne State University (1992).
Powell v. Superior Court, 283 Cal. Rptr. 777 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991). See Seth Mydans,

Los Angeles Policemen Acquitted in Taped Beating, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 30,1992, at Al. All four

officers were acquitted, after one day of jury deliberations, of assault with a deadly
weapon and three were acquitted of excessive use of force as a police officer, with the
jury deadlocked on this charge as to one officer. The Los Angeles Prosecutor later
indicated he would seek a retrial on this charge; venue for the retrial was set in Los

Angeles. David Margolick, As Venues Are Changed, Many Ask How Important a Role Race

Should Play, N.Y. TIMES, May 23, 1992, § 1 at 7.
4
Rodney King, an African-American motorist, was stopped by police after a high
speed chase on March 3, 1991 at about 1:00 a.m. in Los Angeles. A resident of a nearby
apartment captured an apparently vicious beating by several police officers with batons
on videotape. The tape was repeatedly played on local and national television news

Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1993

1

CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 41:215

verdict and the attendant riots highlighted continuing problems of police
racism and raised the specter of continued urban strife. Soon after the verdict
some legal observers suggested that an earlier decision to order a change of
suburban community of Simi Valley 5 was
venue from urban Los Angeles to the
6
the critical feature in the acquittal.

programs setting off a barrage of news reporting and commentary. On March 14, 1992

four police officers, three observed on the taped beating of Rodney King, and one
supervisor, were indicted by a Los Angeles grand jury.
Early in April Los Angeles Mayor Tom Bradley appointed an investigatory
commission (the Christopher Commission) and called for Police Chief Darryl Gates to
resign. The Police Commission suspended him.
In May 1991, the grand jury refused to indict nineteen police officers who were
bystanders to the beating. Three of the indicted officers were suspended without pay
by Chief Gates and one officer without tenure was dismissed. The chief's suspension
was voided by a court and four police commissioners resigned.
In the summer of 1991 the Christopher Commission recommended the replacement
of Chief Gates as well as other numerous reforms. Chief Gates announced his retirement
as of April 1992 but later indicated a willingness to continue his employment. The Los
Angeles City Council approved a ballot to implement the Commission's
recommendations. In April 1992, Willie Williams, Philadelphia's police chief, was
appointed to replace Chief Gates.
The Powell case took several turns. Trial Judge Bernard Kamins pushed defense
attorneys to try the case without delay, refused a change of venue, and then apparently
reversed himself in an unusual letter to the California Court of Appeals. On defense
motions, the Court of Appeals removed Judge Kamins in August 1991, Briseno v.
Superior Court, 284 Cal. Rptr. 640 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991), and ordered a change of venue.
In the fall of 1991, Los Angeles SuperiorJudge Weisberg selected Ventura County as the
new site of the trial. See infra note 83.
Following the verdict, Los Angeles erupted in three days of violent rioting that
claimed sixty lives and caused $850 million in damage. The history of the case, including
relevant political background, is reported in Powell v. Superior Court, 283 Cal. Rptr.
777, 779-81 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991); Mydans, supra note 3; Cecilia Rasmussen, The Rodney
King Case Chronology, L.A. TIMES, July 10, 1991, at A12.; A Case Filled With Twists and
Turns, L.A. DAILY JOURNAL, April 30, 1992, at 9.
5

Simi Valley is in suburban Ventura County, immediately to the west of Los Angeles
County and northwest of the City of Los Angeles. Ten jurors were white, one Asian,
and one Hispanic. According to the 1990 census, the population of Ventura County was
White: 529,166 (79.1%); Black: 15,629 (2.3%); and Asian/Other: 124,221 (18.6%).
Similarly, Los Angeles County was White: 5,035,103 (56.8%); Black: 992,974 (11.2%);
and Asian/Other: 2,835,087 (32.0%). The black population of the Simi Valley census
division was 1.5% of the total. BUREAU OFTHE CENSUS, 1990 CENSUS OF POPULATION AND
HOUSING (Summary Tape File 1A,Pacific Division, California). According to defendant
Briseno's attorney, "[p]olitically, racially, and culturally,.. . Simi Valley is as different
from downtown Los Angeles 'as Manhattan is from the moon.' Margolick, supra note
3, at 7. Jane Gross, In Simi Valley, Defense Of a Shared Way of Life, N.Y. TIMES, May 4,1992,
at B7.
6
See David Margolick, Switching Case to White Suburb May Have Decided Outcome,
N.Y. TIMES, May 1, 1992, at A20; Patricia Montemurri, The Los Angeles Eruption: Race is
called wild card in trials- Jurors' values can tip scales in close cases, DETROIT FREE PRESS, May
1, 1992, at 1OA; Martin Berg, D.A.'s Action on King Venue Are Questioned, L.A. DAILY
JOURNAL, May 7, 1992, at 1; Timothy O'Neill, Wrong Place, Wrong Jury, N.Y. TIMES, May
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The vicinage right to be tried by "an impartial jury of the State and district
wherein the crime shall have been committed" 7 is one of the Sixth Amendment
rights least commented upon. The United States Supreme Court has not
explicitly incorporated this right, along with the right to a fair and impartial
jury, into the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 8 Even if it were
incorporated, the right to local venue is clearly not absolute and must at times
give way to the broader right to a fair trial. Cases and comments refer to the
evils committed by the British Crown before the revolution, 9 enumerated in
the Declaration of Independence, 10 as the historic basis for placing the venue
right in the body of the Constitution.11 In cases where the government seeks to
impose an onerous or "counterintuitive" venue on a defendant, especially in a
case with political overtones, Justice Douglas' dissenting comment, that "[a]ny
doubts should be resolved in favor of the citizen" may be appropriate. 12 But
9, 1992, § 1, at 23; Joseph Grano, Change of venue rules protect rights of accused, DETROrr
NEWS, May 10, 1992, at 3B.
7U.S. CONST. amend. VI. Rules of venue (place of trial) and vincinage (place from
which jury selected) are largely determined by state constitutions, laws, and rules.
Federal law is discussed herein to shed light on underlying principles and policies. See
generally 2 W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 16.1 (1984).
8
See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968), reh'g denied, 392 U.S. 947 (1968)
(recognizing that the Sixth Amendment right to jury trial applies to states);
Commonwealth v. Duteau, 424 N.E.2d 1119, 1126 (Mass. 1981) (finding that vicinage
right not incorporated). Lisa Alexander, Vicinage, Venue, and Community Cross-Section:
Obstacles to a State Defendant's Right toa Trial by a RepresentativeJury, 19 HASTINGS CONST.
L.Q. 261, 285 (1991) (noting that Supreme Court cases incorporating and applying the
Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial have implicitly incorporated vicinage right).
9

When the British Parliament proposed taking Americans abroad or to
another colony for trial, the Virginia Resolves of May 16, 1769, voiced
the unanimous view that 'thereby the inestimable Privilege of being
tried by a Jury from the Vicinage, as well as the Liberty of summoning
and producing Witnesses on such Trial, will be taken away from the
Party accused.
Johnston v. United States, 351 U.S. 215, 224 (1956), reh'g denied, 352 U.S. 860 (1956)
(quoting JOURNALS OF THE HOUSE OF BURGESSES OF VIRGINIA 24 (1766-1769)) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting).
See Francis Heller, The Sixth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States: A Study
In Constitutional Development 93 (1969); Drew Kershen, Vicinage, 29 OKLA. L. REV. 801,
806 (1976) (pts. I & II), 30 OKLA. L. REV. 1 (1977) (pts. III & IV).
10" . .- [Flor depriving us in many cases, of the benefits of Trial by Jury:-For
transporting us beyond Seas to be tried for pretended offences: .... ",THE DECLARATION
OF INDEPENDENCE (U.S. 1776).
11

The Trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of Impeachment, shall be by Jury;
and such Trial shall be held in the State where the said Crimes shall have
been committed; but when not committed within any State, the Trial shall
be at such Place or Places as the Congress may by Lw have directed.
U.S. CONST., art. III, § 2, cl. 3.
12Johston, 351 U.S. at 224 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (arguing that the proper venue
for a defendant military draft registrant who was classified as a conscientious objector
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where the defendant seeks to change venue on fairness grounds, it is not so
clear that a simple reflex in favor of changing venue necessarily insures a fair
trial or adequately resolves the competing interests at stake. This is reflected in
the significant proportion of appeals that almost routinely deny change of
venue motions. 13 In any event, venue issues in criminal law typically are
decision-making, rather
treated as intellectual puzzles that require hairsplitting
14
than the analysis of constitutional interests.
There is not an extensive body of constitutional law concerning change of
venue. It is clear that a categorical prohibition of change of venue violates due
process. 15 On the other hand, it is the fair trial that is fundamental, 16 not the
change of venue, and the cases recognize that courts have various methods of
dealing with pretrial publicity and community prejudice, including the voir
dire, continuances, controlling the courtroom atmosphere, and controlling
17
what the parties, counsel, and law enforcement personnel say to the press.
Thus, while the Supreme Court has ruled that a state conviction violates due
process where pretrial publicity poisoned the minds of the jurors, 18 and has
19
reversed a conviction because there should have been a change of venue,
these cases at most confirm a right to have a court consider a venue change,
not a right to a change of venue. In Irvin v. Dowd 20 and Rideau,21 it was not the
existence of pretrial publicity and its effect on the trial per se that constituted
the constitutional violation. Rather, it was the manner in which state officials

in his district of residence and who refused to report for civilian work in another district
was the district in which defendant failed to appear and not his district of residence).
13Peter G. Guthrie, Annotation, Pretrial Publicity In Criminal Cases As Ground for
Changeof Venue, 33 A.L.R.3d 17,46-51 (1970), reports, in § 8, twenty-one cases where a
change of venue was held unwarranted and two where the change was warranted. In
the 1992 supplement, § 8 contains nine pages reporting cases denying change of venue
and two pages reporting cases allowing a change. Id. (Supp. 1992).

14 "The argument in the case has been like a theological debate over the number of
angels who can stand on the head of a pin." Johnston v. United States, 351 U.S. 215, 223
(1956) (Douglas, J., dissenting). See Salinger v. Loisel, 265 U.S. 224 (1924).
15See Groppi v. Wisconsin, 400 U.S. 505 (1971) (stating that due process is violated
where change of venue is prohibited by statute in misdemeanor trials).
16

1d. at 512 (Blackmun, J., concurring).

17

See Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966) (reasoning that massive, prejudicial
pretrial publicity violated defendant's due process right to fair trial where trial judge
exercised virtually no control and trial became a "Roman holiday").
181rvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717 (1961).
19

Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723 (1963).

20366 U.S. 717.
21373 U.S. 723.
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heightened the publicity's impact or failed to take measures to mitigate it.22
This is borne out by limitations, noted in Irvin, that are relevant to this study:
It is not required ... that the jurors be totally ignorant of the facts and
issues involved. In these days of swift, widespread and diverse
communication, an important case can be expected to arouse the
interest of the public in the vicinity, and scarcely any of those best
qualified to serve as jurors will not have formed some impression or
opinion as to the merits of the case. This is particularly true in criminal
cases. To hold that the mere existence of any preconceived notion as to
the guilt or innocence of an accused, without more, is sufficient to rebut
the presumption of a prospective juror's impartiality would be to
establish an impossible standard. It is sufficient if the juror can lay aside
his impression or opinion and render a verdict based on the evidence
presented in court.
This article analyzes the California Court of Appeals decision in Powell v.
Superior Court of Los Angeles County,24 that issued a writ of mandate on pretrial
appeal, 25 directing the trial judge to order a defense motion for change of
venue. 26 The premise of the article is that the decision was inadequate in
significant ways and concludes that the court of appeals improperly exercised
its discretion. The venue in the "Rodney King" case properly belonged in Los
Angeles County. Two broad lines of reasoning supporting this conclusion are
offered. First, as discussed in Part II, the reasoning of Powell was wanting. Parts
22

1n Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717 (1961), ninety percent of the prospective jurors
examined expressed some opinion about the defendant's guilt, and eight panelists who
thought the defendant was guilty sat on the jury. Although these jurors said they would
be impartial the Court felt that it would have been difficult, in light of the pervasive
prejudice, for the jurors to be impartial. Id. In Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723 (1963),
the defendant made oral confessions on television two months before the trial while
flanked by law enforcement officers. The majority felt that in light of the excessive
publicity the televised confessions amounted to Rideau's real trial. Therefore, due
process required "a trial before a jury drawn from a community of people who had not
seen and heard Rideau's televised 'interview."' Id. The fact that the Supreme Court has
not invalidated another conviction for failing to change venue suggests that the
gravamen of the case was the egregious action of the officials involved.
23
1rvin, 366 U.S. at 722-23.
24

Powell v. Superior Court, 283 Cal. Rptr. 777 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991).

25

Since Maine v. Superior Court, 438 P.2d 372 (Cal. 1968), California appellate courts
have had the authority to order pre-trial changes of venue.
26
, The decision to move the trial to Ventura county was made in November 1991 by
Los Angeles Superior Court Judge Stanley M. Weisberg. Andrea Ford & Daryl Kelley,
King Case To Be Tried in Ventura County, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 27, 1991i at A3. California's
Judicial Council provided the judge a choice of three counties: Ventura, Riverside and
Alameda (Oakland, Cal.). Judge Weisberg chose Ventura because it was more
convenient for the parties and "would also allow Los Angeles residents greatest access
to the courtroom" but the decision did not allow the prosecution to argue that Alameda
contained a racial mix closer to that of Los Angeles. Martin Berg, supra note 6.
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III and IV offer an "interest analysis" that gives a positive and principled reason
for retaining venue in this case: the value of a local community to have
important local decisions made according to its own norms and values.
The interest analysis of the jury's role makes sense only by conceiving the
jury in political terms, not as an arm of the government or an adjunct to the
courts, but as a representative of "the people"-the sovereign people-of which
any jury is a particular and temporary representative. 2 7 The genius of any
particular jury's temporary tenure is that by disbanding and dissolving into
the body of the people immediately after its verdict it cannot grow into an
established and routine office of government; it remains an extension of "the
people." Paradoxically, a given jury must maintain its anonymity to insure that
juries in general retain their power. Shannon Stimson's study of the origins of
American judicial review contrasts the English seventeenth and eighteenth
century view of the jury, as an "effort to prevent political arbitrariness," 28 with
the more revolutionary, Lockean, understanding of the jury in America.
American colonial juries exercised greater authority than contemporaneous
English juries or American juries today by often deciding issues of law as well
as fact as exemplified by John Peter Zenger's acquittal of seditious libel in
1735.29 These practices reflected "a profoundly innovative" view of law not as
"an instrument of state policy" of which Parliament had transcendent
knowledge and absolute and final control. 30 "Rather, [Americans] conceived of
it as the 'reflection' and 'defender' of their 'community and customary
authority', which ordinary men were equally capable of knowing and judging
for themselves.... [Tlhe content of the law itself and the question of 'who shall

27

To regard the jury simply as a judicial institution would be taking a
very narrow view of the matter, for great though its influence on the
outcome of lawsuits is, its influence on the fate of society is much greater
still. The jury is therefore above all a political institution, and it is from
that point of view that it must always be judged.
A. DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 272 (J. Mayer ed. & G. Lawrence trans.
1969).
S. STIMSON, THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION IN THE LAW 41-56, 142-3 (1991) argues that

Locke transmitted to America a framework of ideas and an epistemology of skepticism
that formed the basis for a concept of popular sovereignty that raised the common man
or "the people" to the position of being the repository of sovereignty, of having the power
to reason about law and make legal and political judgments, and as establishing the
foundation for the American approach to judicial review. This was embodied
institutionally in the powerful role of juries in the colonies and early Republic.
28
29

1d. at 5.
1d. at 54-62. Phillip Scott, Jury Nullification: An HistoricalPerspective on a Modern

Debate, 91 W. VA. L. REV. 389 (1989), argues cogently that neither Bushell's Case, 124
EngRep. 1006 (1670) nor Zenger's Case, 16 Amer. State Trials 1-39 (1735) establish clear
historical support for jury nullification. The existence of greater jury authority to make
decisions of law in the early Republic is acknowledged as is the demise of this jury
authority.
3

0STIMSON, supra note 27, at 5.
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judge' in matters of law was in dispute. 3 1 After a brief period of
post-Revolutionary support for jury hegemony,32 the demands for legal
uniformity in the new Republic suppressed the assertion of jury power. At the
present time, jury nullification is recognized as a covert and illegitimate power,
dangerous to the proper functioning of law and to be hemmed in by voir dire,
the judge's instructions, and by the tempo, tone, and structure of the trial. 33
The jury's current role, closer to that of England than Revolutionary America,
is as a factfinder clearly subordinate to the courts' hegemony over the
interpretation of law.
It is not argued that the jury's historical importance to the jurisprudence and
political theory of the nation's founding, or the notion of juries as political
bodies, requires a reversion to an exaggerated idea of localism that would make
changes of venue all but impossible. Nor is an argument advanced for jury
nullification. The kind of local consensus on which "government by jury" had
to be based, after all, was "'disintegrating' by the last decade of the eighteenth
century."34 And in recent years the Supreme Court has imposed powerful
national requirements on jury selection to overcome the effects of local
prejudice. 35 The role of the jury has been so subordinated to the professional
agenda of the courts that all consideration of interests other than that of
providing a mythically impartial factfinder has been virtually lost. The modest
goal in this article is to suggest additional interests, inherent in the jury, that
give greater weight to keeping the criminal trial in the county of original venue.
This interest analysis is put forward not as a jurisprudential base for radically
restructuring change of venue decisions, which must continue to be
discretionary. The goal is to suggest, in venue change cases, other values that
will clarify the interests at stake and help to produce better considered
decisions, especially in cases where localism is a pressing value and the value
of changing venue is dubious.

31
32

id. (emphasis in original).
[d. at 61.

33

Sparf v. United States, 156 U.S. 51 (1895) (recognizing that a jury does not possess
right to decide questions of law). A few scholars have supported a limited recognition
of jury nullification in politically salient cases, but none have gone to the extreme, as
allowing a jury to exercise the power of "judicial review." The proposal of any level of
jury nullification has met with fierce opposition. Scott, supra note 29, at 419-23.
34

STIMSON, supra note 27, at 139.

35

A series of equal protection cases has eliminated the authority of lawyers to exercise
peremptory challenges on the basis of race. See, e.g., Georgia v. McCollum, 112 S. Ct.
2348 (1992) (discussing criminal defendants); Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 111
S. Ct. 2077 (1991), on remand, 943 F.2d 551 (5th Cir. 1991), reh'g denied, Oct. 21, 1991
(discussing civil litigants); Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400 (1991) (excluding
African-American jurors where defendant is white); Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79
(1986) (excluding African-American jurors where defendant is black).
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II. ANALYSIS OF PEOPLEV.POWELL: A FRUITLESS SEARCH FOR IMPARTIALITY

A. Overview of California Change of Venue Law
Under California procedure, a trial court's denial of a motion for change of
venue may be appealed before trial by a writ of mandate.36 The appellate court
must make an independent determination of the facts to decide whether a fair
trial can be held in the county of original venue. 3 7 A showing of actual prejudice

is not required. 38 In Powell the court of appeals made its judgment appear
mandatory by noting that § 1033(a) of the California Penal Code "requires a
change of venue 'when it appears that there is a reasonable likelihood that a
' 39
fair and impartial trial cannot be had in the county. " The court concluded
that in this instance a "motion for change of venue shall be granted upon a
determination that dissemination of potentially prejudicial material results in
40
a reasonablelikelihood a fair trial cannot be had in the county of original venue."
Since the statute is silent about the possibility of an equal level of potential bias
outside as well as inside the county of original venue, a brittle argument can
be made that once the appellate court finds a reasonable likelihood that a fair
trial cannot be held within the county, its task is done and a writ of mandate
must be issued ordering the trial moved. 4 1 Such a conclusion is, of course,

36

Maine v. Superior Court, 438 P.2d 372 (Cal. 1968).

37

1d. at 382.

38

Powell v. Superior Court, 283 Cal. Rptr. 777, 782 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991) (citing Maine
v. Superior Court, 438 P.2d 372 (Cal. 1968)); People v. Hamilton, 774 P.2d 730 (Cal. 1989),
cert. denied sub noni., Hamilton v. California, 494 U.S. 1039 (1990); and Odle v. Superior
Court, 654 P.2d 225 (Cal. 1982).
39

The change of venue rules of several states are similar to California's in focussing
on prejudice in the county of original venue making it impossible to get a fair trial there.
See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, para. 114-6(a) (Smith-Hurd 1992); Md. Rule 4-254 (1992);
Mo. REV. STAT. § 545.430 (1991); N.Y. [CRIM. PROC.] LAW § 230.20 (Consol. 1992). Others
are less directive, thus not creating an exclusive focus on whether a fair trial can be had
in the county of original venue. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 762.7 (West 1992).
A good formulation is adopted by New Jersey: "A change of venue in any civil or
criminal cause in the superior court may be ordered by the court for good cause shown."
N.J. REV. STAT. ANN. § 2A:2-13 (West 1991).
40powell, 283 Cal. Rptr. at 782 (emphasis in original) (citing CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 1033(a)). The reasonable likelihood standard was articulated by Powell to require
something less than "more probable than not," and something more than "merely
possible." Id. A showing of actual prejudice is not required to make out the "reasonable
likelihood" standard. People v. Hamilton, 259 Cal. Rptr. 701 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989).
41

This, indeed, was defense counsel's argument to stay the trial court's decision
refusing to change venue. Brief on Petitionfor Writ of Mandateand Requestfor Immediate
Stay of ProceedingsBelow, Powell v. Superior Court, Los Angeles Superior Court No. BA
035498 (June 6, 1991) at 9-15. Counsel argued that CAL. PENAL CODE§ 1033(a) required
a change of venue when the reasonable likelihood standard is met. Counsel, in this
pretrial brief, evaluated five factors drawn from the cases (nature and gravity of crime,
victim's prominence, defendant's status, community size, and nature and extent of news
coverage), but failed to address the political factor later relied on in Powell as the
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nonsense. Under established canons of interpretation, the literal application of
a statute is not required if it would create an absurdity or injustice. 42 Indeed,
the notable California Court of Appeals case of People v. Manson43 held that a
change of venue is not required when publicity is so widespread that there is
no likelihood of a gain in fairness by going to the inconvenience and expense
of moving the trial. The Powell Court distinguished Manson as a notorious
criminal case which was "not entangled in local politics, did not focus on local
politicians, and did not involve issues unique to Los Angeles County."44
Modem California change of venue case law began with Maine v. Superior
Court,4 5 which established pretrial use of mandamus to compel venue changes
in light of Sheppardv. Maxwell.46 Sheppard obliged state courts, under the United
States Constitution, to reduce the effects of pretrial publicity on criminal trials.
While not offering a checklist, Maine pointed to the seriousness of the crimes
(murder, rape and kidnapping), the small size of the community, the
defendants' status as strangers, the victim's innocence and the community's
outpouring of concern for her, a high level of local publicity, a reported
confession, and the intrusion of political factors, in finding that a change of

deciding factor granting the change of venue. Powell, 283 Cal. Rptr. at 782-85. The
political factor had been an obscure factor prior to Powell, raised in only a few cases,
and counsel was not remiss in failing to see its value. Id.
However, defense counsel criticized Judge Kamins for applying "an incorrect legal
standard," namely, whether "there is a county to which the trial could be transferred
where there is not the same probability of adverse publicity affecting the defendants."
BriefforMandate,at 15. Judge Kamins, finding no statutory basis for such a factor, labeled
it a so-called "Kamins factor." While counsel had a point in complaining that defense

counsel are not required to prove this under the statute, the brief did not cite People v.
Manson, 132 Cal. Rptr. 265 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976), which established a common law basis
for considering the factor of widespread out-of-county publicity.
42

J. WILLARD HURST, DEALING WITH STATUTES 46-48 (1982).

43132 Cal. Rptr. 265 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976). See also United States v. Haldeman, 559 F.2d
31 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. denied, Ehrlichman v. United States, 431 U.S. 933 (1977), reh'g
denied, Mitchell v. United States, 433 U.S. 916 (1977) (involving defendants who were all
Watergate scandal participants, namely: John Mitchell, former Attorney General; H.R.
Haldeman, President Nixon's chief of staff; and John Ehrlichman, domestic advisor to
President Nixon); Collins v. Egeler, 539 F.2d 597 (6th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 889
(1976) (involving a mass murderer notorious throughout state of Michigan); United
States v. Cohn, 230 F.Supp. 589 (S.D.N.Y. 1964) (involving Roy Cohn, a nationally
notorious attorney who was previously an advisor to Sen. Joseph McCarthy). But see
People v. Gacy, 468 N.E.2d 1171 (Ill. 1984), cert. denied, Gacy v. Illinois, 470 U.S. 1037
(1985), reh'g denied, 471 U.S. 1062 (1985) (involving a mass murderer who buried 33
victims under a house and committed homosexual assaults. The case received national
publicity and the jury was selected from Winnebago County and trial was held in Cook
County); People v. Speck, 242 N.E.2d 208 (Ill. 1968) (involving a mass murder of a group
of nurses in Chicago. The case received national publicity).
44Powell v. Superior Court, 283 Cal. Rptr. 777, 784 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991).
45438 P.2d 372 (Cal. 1968)

46384 U.S. 333 (1964).
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venue must be ordered. The California Supreme Court made a critical
assumption that was unthinkingly incorporated in many later cases. Maine
assumed that news of the crime did not travel far and did not influence public
opinion in more urban areas of the state: "[iun a case of this nature it would
probably be prudent to transfer the case to a metropolitan area where
comparatively little difficulty will be encountered in empaneling a jury free
from any kind of prejudgment.' 4 7 This change of venue stereotype is so strong
that it helps carry the day even when the facts do not fit the issue presented. In
this regard Justice Stanley Mosk added in a footnote, perhaps for the sake of
completeness, that "[w]e do not intend to suggest, however, that a large city
48
may not also become so hostile to a defendant as to make a fair trial unlikely."
The implications of this dictum were not worked out any further. Finally, Maine
also laid out a flexible methodology for exercising change of venue discretion:
"We do not assert categorically that each individual circumstance here, isolated
and alone, would compel a change of venue."49 Rather it was for a court to
weigh all the facts and circumstances in deciding whether they so influenced
the public mind as to negate a reasonable possibility of a fair trial.
Cases following Maine turned its loose review of items into a numbered list
of factors. People v. Balderas,50 for example, refers to "five controlling factors:
the gravity and nature of the crime, the extent and nature of the publicity, the
size and nature of the community, the status of the victim, and the status the
accused." 51 Additionally, on "postconviction review, we must also examine the
voir dire of prospective and actual jurors to determine whether pretrial
publicity did in fact have a prejudicial effect." 52 Courts applied these factors
with varying weights as fit the circumstances. 53 As these factors were repeated

47438 P.2d at 380. (emphasis added).
48
d. at 380.
49

1d.

50711 P.2d 480 (Cal. 1985) (failing to grant a change of venue. This case involved
capital murder and kidnapping. The court concluded that publicity was not unusual
for the nature of the crime. The crime occurred in a large county and the victims were
average citizens. Defendant was Hispanic, but was not a stranger in the county).
51

Balderas, 711 P.2d at 496.

52

1d. at 496-97.

53

Martinez v. Superior Court, 629 P.2d 502 (Cal. 1981) (finding that publicity, the size
of the county and the nature of the crime are controlling in ordering a venue change.
The court also found that the status of the victim and the accused were less important
and were not controlling).
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in other cases, some did not include "politics" as a factor,54 while other cases
did.

55

54

See People v. Fauber, 831 P.2d 249 (Cal. 1992), cert. denied, Fauber v. California, No.
92-7148, 1993 WL 14266 (U.S. Mar. 29, 1993) (failing to change venue in a murder case.
Publicity was not considered prejudicial. The county was large. The victim's death did
not engender unusual emotion and defendant was not an outsider); People v. Howard,
824 P.2d 1315 (Cal. 1992), cert. deniedsub nom. Howard v. California, 113 S. Ct. 383 (1992)
(failing to change venue in a murder case. Publicity was low compared to other cases.
The county was small. The victim not prominent. That the defendant was black in a
predominantly white county was not a factor in this case); People v. Price, 821 P.2d 610
(Cal. 1991), cert.denied sub nom. Price v. California, 113 S. Ct. 152 (1992) (failing to change
venue ina murder case. There was intermittent publicity. The county was small. The
victim's death did not cause unusual emotion. The defendant was a not minority or
friendless outsider); People v. Edwards, 819 P.2d 436 (Cal. 1991), cert. denied sub nom.
Edwards v. California, 113 S.Ct. 125 (1992) (failing to change venue in a murder case.
Publicity was extensive but fair and not inflamatory. The county was large. The victim
was a child. The defendant was not an outsider. There was a political factor, namely
that the sheriff criticized the public defender. The passage of time was a special factor
weighing heavily against a change in venue); People v. Sully, 812 P.2d 163 (1991), cert.
denied sub nom. Sully v. California, 112 S.Ct. 1494 (1992) (failing to change venue where
the crime involved six counts of murder. Substantial publicity dissipated by the time of
the trial. The county was large. The victims were outsiders and criminals. The defendant
was a resident and successful person); People v. Cooper, 809 P.2d 865 (Cal. 1991), cert.
denied sub nom. Cooper v. California, 112 S. Ct. 664 (1992) (granting venue change once
from San Bernardino to San Diego, but was not ordered a second time. The crime
involved four murders. There was extensive publicity. The county was large. The
victims were family members. The defendant was an escaped prisoner); People v.
Jennings, 807 P.2d 1009 (Cal. 1991), cert.denied sub non. Jennings v. California, 112 S. Ct.
443 (1991) (failing to change venue where the crime involved three murders and other
heinous crimes. Publicity was not extensive. The county was large. The victims were
prostitutes); People v. Daniels, 802 P.2d 906 (Cal. 1991), cert. denied sub non. Daniel v.
California 112 S. Ct. 145 (1991) (failing to change venue where the crime involved two
murders. Publicity was extensive at first, then it declined. The county was large. The
victims were 2 police officers killed in the line of duty. The defendant was a black man
who was formerly convicted of robbery).
55People v. Hamilton, 774 P.2d 730 (Cal. 1989), cert. denied sub non. Hamilton v.
California, 494 U.S. 1039 (1990) (failing to change venue in a case of murder for hire. The
publicity was extensive but not inflammatory. No conclusions of guilt were offered in
the editorials. The county was small. The victim was the pregnant wife of the defendant
and was not prominent. The defendant was not a stranger or a minority group member.
There was a political factor inasmuch as the defendant filed a State Bar grievance against
the prosecutor and requested a recusal. This factor was not significant.); Williams v.
Superior Court, 668 P.2d 799 (Cal. 1983) (ordering a change of venue where the crime
invovled capital murder, rape, robbery, burglary, and kidnapping. There was extensive
publicity over two years, including a period when the brother of the defendant was tried
on the same charges in a separate trial. The county was small. The victim was a young
white woman described as a virgin in news reports. The defendant was a young black
man who was a stranger to the county. The purported political factor was that the
prosecuting attorney had run unsuccessfully for District Attorney during the case and
a defense attorney was a staunch supporter of the opponent, although the court rejected
that these facts alone constituted a political factor); Frazier v. Superior Court, 486 P.2d
694 (Cal. 1971) (ordering a venue change in a case involving multiple murders,
committed execution style, and accompanied by "hippie" symbols. The publicity was
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Among the California criminal venue cases, Powell is unique in that it is the
only one where a change of venue was based exclusively on the political factor:
We emphasize, however, that were this simply a matter of
extraordinary publicity we might have reached a different conclusion.
What compels our decision in this case is the high level of political
turmoil and controversy which this incident has generated, which
continues to this day and appears likely to56continue at least until the
time when a trial of this matter can be had.
The political controversy factor was given comparatively as much attention as
the other relevant factors combined. 57 We contend that although this factor was
a plausible basis for the change of venue, given the unusual level of political
controversy surrounding the Rodney King beating, it was erroneously relied
on as the controlling factor because it did not contribute to an impartial jury.
This conclusion is easy to make from hindsight. But we believe that given the
widespread and intense level of publicity and the particular circumstances of
the case, this should have been apparent prior to the trial.
B. Analysis of Change of Venue Factors
The following analysis critically reviews, on two levels, the factors relied on
by Powell. First, this discussion will explore the potential weight of each factor
for or against a venue change as an independent variable; then the factors will
be investigated interdependently, asking whether considered in toto they
support a change of venue decision. It is emphasized that in this part of the
article these factors are analyzed from the traditional perspective of providing
a fair trial by empaneling an impartial jury. Nevertheless, the overall,
'political," assessment of change of venue, in Parts III and WV,
transcends the
qualified and
be
jury
must
impartial
of
an
traditional approach; the concept
position will
The
alternative
values other than impartiality must be considered.
with an
begin
will
section
This
II.
evolve out of the discussion in Part
and
court
the
by
treatment
cursory
given
factors
five
of
the
examination
factor.
political
of
the
an
analysis
with
conclude
Natureand Gravity of the Offense. The nature of the charges in Powell were not
spectacular: 58 charges of "assault and battery" simply do not stir the soul of the

extensive due to an outpouring of community concern. The murders occurred after the
infamous "Manson family" killings. The county was small. The victims included a
prominent physician, his family and his secretary. The defendant was identified as a
"hippie" at time of public hostility to "hippie" subculture. The political factor consisted
of newspaper editorials commenting on the high cost of the prosecution to the county).
56

Powell v. Superior Court, 283 Cal. Rptr. 777, 779 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991).

57

powell devoted four pages to the analysis of the political factor and four pages to
all other factors combined. Id. at 781-88.
58
The peculiar facts or aspects of a crime which make it sensational, or
otherwise bring it to the consciousness of the community, define its
"nature"; the term "gravity" of a crime refers to its seriousness in the
https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol41/iss2/4
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average city dweller. Thus, the nature of the charges alone, independent of all
other factors, did not weigh in favor of changing venue from Los Angeles.
Ordinarily, even a savage beating does not generate a case for a venue change,
as acknowledged by the court: "the crime of assault and battery does not
compare to the gruesome murders involved in other notorious cases tried in
Los Angeles County, e.g., Charles Manson, the 'Night Stalker,' the 'Hillside
60
Strangler.'" 59 While changing venue is typically reserved for murder cases,
moves have been ordered in lesser crimes such as robbery and bribery where
61
the circumstances indicated outraged public opinion. The cases indicate that
it is not the inherent horror of the crime, as much as the public reaction to it,
that adds heft to the crime seriousness factor as a basis for changing venue.
Why then was this crime deemed so serious? It is not too much to say that
the nature of the crime, while not stirring the community's emotions in the
same way as notorious murders, had in another way produced a stronger public
62
reaction. It was not simply the police brutality (which involves the status of
defendant and victim), since such cases occur with revolting regularity in the
United States.63 Nor was the seriousness based solely on the videotaping of a
law and to the possible consequences to an accused in the event of a
guilty verdict.
Martinez v. Superior Court, 629 P.2d 502, 506 (Cal. 1981).
59

Powell, 283 Cal. Rptr. at 784.

60

Wiliams v. Superior Court, 668 P.2d 799 (Cal. 1983); Martinez v. Superior Court,
629 P.2d 502 (Cal. 1981); Frazier v. Superior Court, 486 P.2d 694 (Cal. 1971); People v.
Tidwell, 473 P.2d 748 (Cal. 1970); Fain v. Superior Court, 465 P.2d 23 (Cal. 1970); Maine
v. Superior Court, 438 P.2d 372 (Cal. 1968); Corona v. Superior Court, 101 Cal. Rptr. 411
(Cal. Ct. App. 1972); Clifton v. Superior Court, 86 Cal. Rptr. 612 (Cal. Ct. App. 1970).
61Young v. Superior Court, 178 Cal. Rptr. 394 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981) (robbery
solicitation by police officer); Smith v. Superior Court, 80 Cal. Rptr. 693 (Cal. Ct. App.
1969) (involving bribery of public officials).
62
Although the jury in the Powell trial acquitted defendants of assault charges, we
refer to the case as an instance of police brutality. Powell v. Superior Court, 283 Cal.
Rptr. 777 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991). This reflects our belief, apparently shared by a large
portion of the public, that the verdict was not fitting. A federal indictment of the four
officers for violating Rodney King's Fourth Amendment protection against an
unreasonable arrest and the pending police department suspension hearings also reflect
the belief that the King beating was a case of brutality. Robert Reinhold, U.S. Jury Indicts
4 Police Officers in King Beating, N.Y. TIMEs, August 6, 1992, at Al.
63
Indirect evidence of police brutality is found in the extensive news and legal
coverage of this topic. Newsbank, a "current awareness reference service" which contains
references to newspapers in over 450 cities, has subheading for "Police Brutality and
Ethics," listing newspaper articles that appear regularly under that heading. Articles
under the heading "Police Brutality" are found in the CRIMINAL JUSTICE PERIODICAL
INDEX: in 1988 two columns under that heading appeared, each column listing
approximately 25 entries; 1989 -5 columns, 1990 - 2 columns, 1991 - 4 columns, 1992 - 8
columns.
A majority of whites and blacks say they have a great deal of respect for
the police. Nevertheless, a large share of whites (33 percent) and blacks (45
percent) believe police brutality occurs in their local area. The videotape
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particular assault, although a filmed private beating would have become a local
cause-cdlbre.Rather, the fascination of the case lay in the televised videotape of
an egregious and race related instance of police brutality. The evidence of the
eyes turned Rodney King's beating into a national symbol of police brutality.
Understanding the public reaction requires an appreciation of Jerome Hall's
dictum that penal harm is "incorporeal" and has a normative-empirical
reference based on "a complex of fact, valuation and interpersonal relations not an observable thing or effect, as is sometimes assumed. '64 If crime
seriousness is, then, in the eye of the beholder, it is legitimate to ask whether
the crime was as well known outside Los Angeles as within, and if it was, how
its nature was perceived and its seriousness weighed there. This topic will be
discussed below.
Extent and Nature of Publicity. Powell dutifully recapitulated the news
coverage of Rodney King's beating, the progress of the prosecution, and the
intense political repercussions of the affair, but limited its focus to Los
Angeles. 65 As is typical in such cases, the court relied on media surveys offered
by defense counsel. In separate brief sections the court reviewed news coverage
radio, and television, captioning the latter as
in Los Angeles newspapers,
"graphic and devastating."66 The court noted that the televised images of the
videotaped beating "eventually was seen by viewers all over the world, and
the world's reaction filtered back to a shocked community."67 The court of
appeals' comments about massive media coverage in Manson certainly applied
to Powell:
The journalistic energy spawned by this case goes beyond the
material we have mentioned. It is patently clear that the crimes
charged, as well as the identity and the involvement of appellants,
permeated every comer of this state with varying degrees of intensity.
The ubiquity of media coverage made any such differential one of
insignificant degree. A change of venue offered no solution to the
publicity problem. Even if venue had been changed, nothing could

of L.A. police officers beating Rodney King clearly heightened awareness

of police brutality. The proportion of all Americans who think some of their
local police use excessive force rose from just 9 percent in 1965 to a full 35
percent in the spring of 1991.
and Whites Work Together
Russell, Middle-Aged Boorners Poisedto Clean Up the Mess; Blacks
In L.A., THE BOOMER REPORT, June 15,1992, at vol. IV, no. 6,p. 1 (The Gallup Poll Monthly;
The Public Perspective; Trends in Public Opinion - A Compendium of Survey Data
1989).
64

J. HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAw 217 (2d ed. 1960).

65

"[W]e take judicial notice of the continuing and pervasive publicity involving the
ongoing political controversy in the City of Los Angeles ....Powell v. Superior Court,
283 Cal. Rptr. 777, 779 n.2 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991).
66
1d. at 784. See, e.g., Martinez v. Superior Court, 629 P.2d 502, 503-05 (Cal. 1981).
67

Powell, 283 Cal. Rptr. at 784.
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have prevented the public media from swinging its attention to
that
68
place. The magnetic pull of such notorious cases is compelling.
Yet, Powell crisply and quickly laid to rest Manson's reasoning in a conclusory
manner: "the publicity surrounding the incident itself has been unequaled in
Los Angeles County. Of even greater importance is the impact upon the
citizenry of the political uproar resulting from the incident."69 It is true that
Powell's political factors set it apart from other California cases which spawned
nationwide publicity, such as the Juan Corona mass murders and the infamous
"Manson family" murders of Sharon Tate and others. 70 Yet, as will be shown
below, the invasive nature of contemporary television and the existence of the
videotapes made the publicity in this case materially different in how it affected
all viewers, both in Los Angeles and anywhere else in the United States. The
court, while obliquely acknowledging the publicity's national reach, narrowly
focused on Los Angeles and failed to confront its impact on potential jurors in
other counties.
Because Powell followed the convention of reviewing the influence of
publicity on potential jurors within the county of original venue, it is difficult
to fathom the extent of external impact from the court's opinion. The opinion
poll presented by defense counsel 71 was nevertheless biased. Once judicial
68

People v. Manson, 132 Cal. Rptr. 265, (Cal. Ct. App. 1976), cert. denied sub nom.
Manson v. California 430 U.S. 986 (1977). See Cohen v. Curtis Publishing Co., 333 F.2d
974 (2d Cir. 1964), cert.denied, 380U.S. 921 (1965) (recognizing thata metropolitan setting
with its diverse population tends to blunt the penetrating effect of publicity).
69
Powell, 283 Cal. Rptr. at 783.
70

Corona v. Superior Court, 101 Cal. Rptr. 411 (Cal. Ct. App. 1972); People v. Manson,
132 Cal. Rptr. 265 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976), cert. denied sub nor. Manson v. California 430
U.S. 986 (1977). These cases do not fit the more typical pattern where publicity is
extensive but not unusual or inflammatory. See, e.g., People v. Edelbacher, 766 P.2d 1
(Cal. 1989); People v. Balderas, 711 P.2d 480 (Cal. 1985); People v. Harris, 623 P.2d 240
(Cal. 1981), cert. denied sub nom. Harris v. California, 454 U.S. 882 (1981).
71
1n support of the motion for change of venue, defendants rely, in part, on
polls of residents of Los Angeles County as reported in the Los Angeles
Times. On March 10, 1991, within a week of the incident, the Los Angeles
Times reported 86 percent of those surveyed had seen the videotape of the
offense and 92 percent believed excessive force had been used. On March 22,
1991, the Los Angeles Tines reported 94 percent of all persons surveyed in
another poll described themselves as "upset" by the incident and almost
two-thirds believed the force used was racially motivated.
Defendants retained experts to conduct a public opinion survey in
the community. In a random sample of 1,000 people, 97 percent were aware
of the incident. That 97 percent was then broken down into a number of
categories: 3 percent believed defendants were not guilty; 70 percent of the
persons from the group who felt defendants were guilty had a "strong" view
about the incident.
These figures, reflecting preconceived attitudes, are significantly higher
than those in similar surveys made in Williams v. Superior Court, supra, 34
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notice can fairly be taken of a firestorm of publicity throughout the state, a poll
only of Los Angeles residents would not be representative of the appropriate
population to be sampled for the purpose of determining whether a more
impartial jury could be obtained elsewhere. The reasoning of Balderas,72 where
a community attitude survey was not allowed into evidence, is preferable:
As the trial court noted, the statistics offered were meaningless on the
venue issue, since they offered no comparisons with statewide
attitudes, or with those in adjoining counties. Thus, they provided no
basis for concluding that the situation in Kern County [Bakersfield]
was abnormal or that a more representative panel could be convened
73
in another location. The proffered evidence was properly excluded.
Available evidence of pretrial national opinion on the Rodney King case is
indirect. Immediately following the outbreak of the post-verdict riot, it was
reported that a "USA Today poll showed almost all blacks and 86 percent of
white Americans thought the verdict was wrong. An ABC News/Washington
Post poll showed only 4 percent of Americans believe the police officers were
innocent; just 5 percent of whites thought so."74 Although taken after the riots,
this poll is indirect evidence of the very large magnitude of knowledge and
opinion about the case before the acquittals.
Size and Nature of Jury Pool. The court of appeals concluded that the
"[i]mmense size of [the] potential jury pool [was] not controlling here."7 5 This
is disputable. The size of the potential jury pool, six and a half million people,
should have weighed, perhaps presumptively, against a change of venue. The
reasoning of Balderas, that the "larger the local population the more likely it is
that preconceptions about the case have not become imbedded in the public
consciousness, 76 cannot be the basis for our conclusion since the case
emphatically was impressed on the public consciousness in Los Angeles. But
if the case became embedded in the public consciousness throughout the state,
then there was a greater likelihood of empaneling an impartial jury from such

Cal.3d at page 590, in which a writ of mandate was granted directing the trial
court to grant a change of venue....
Powell, 283 Cal. Rptr. at 783.
72711 P.2d 480 (Cal. 1985).
73

1d. at 499. "ITIhe control study ought to demonstrate the utility of changing venue,
if it is determined that there is a reasonable likelihood that an impartial jury cannot be
empaneled in the venue county." John W. Kinch, The Jury Survey: Improved Social Science
Input in Change of Venue Decisions, 10 GLENDALE L. REv. 69, 85 (1991).
74
Thomas C. PalmerJr., Amnesia on victim's rights; Did moving the King trial to Ventura
Country harm the accuser's interests?, BOSTON GLOBE, May 3, 1992, at 69.
75

Powell v. Superior Court, 283 Cal. Rptr. 777, 782-83 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991).

76

People v. Balderas, 711 P.2d 480, 497 (Cal. 1985).
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a huge pool than from a smaller venue. 77 The court's desire not to immunize
Los Angeles permanently from venue changes is applauded. The court relied
on Smith, the Los Angeles bribery case, to refuse to make the "logical
conclusion" that forever would bar changes of venue from Los Angeles because
of the jury pool size 78 and cited Maine's dictum that "[w]e do not intend to
suggest, however, that a large city may not also become so hostile to a
defendant as to make a fair trial unlikely."79 Powell, however, failed to adhere
to an even more basic rule of discretionary analysis: "each case must turn on
its own facts .... 80 The facts and circumstances indicate that the case had as
much impact outside Los Angeles as within Los Angeles on the issues that were
relevant to finding an unbiased jury.
Community characteristics, in addition to size, must be taken into account
and favor a denial of a venue change in Powell.8 1 Los Angeles county is an
urban, metropolitan area, a fact not even mentioned by the Powell court. Past
change of venue cases, it seems, infer that a locally notorious case transferred
from a rural county to a metropolitan venue would be "just another trial"
there. 82 Indeed, an argument was made for trying the case in another
metropolitan area, such as Alameda County (Oakland), because it is
cosmopolitan and contains an ethnically diverse population.83 This point was
not explored in Powell and clearly was not the basis for the actual choice of
venue by Los Angeles Superior Court Judge Weisberg. 84
Powell did not systematically examine the relationship between county size
in prior cases and the decision to change venue. A review of cases makes it clear

77

See infra notes 214-26 and accompanying text for our distinction between "perfect"
and "practical" impartiality. Also, we argue in Parts II and 11 that the value of localism
militates in favor of keeping the venue in the county of original venue in such a case.
The reasonableness of this inference depends in part upon our critique of the court's
political factor evaluation. See infra notes 98-107 and accompanying text.
78

Smith v. Superior Court, 80 Cal. Rptr. 693 (Cal. Ct. App. 1969).

79

Maine v. Superior Court, 438 P.2d 372, 380 (Cal. 1968).

80

Powell v. Superior Court, 283 Cal. Rptr. 777, 783 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991) (quoting Fain
v. Superior Court, 465 P.2d 23, 25 (Cal. 1970).
81

Lansdown v. Superior Court, 89 Cal. Rptr. 154 (Cal. Ct. App. 1970); Odle v. Superior
Court, 654 P.2d 225 (Cal. 1982).
82
1n the smallest counties, such as some listed in note 85 infra under counties in which
venue was changed, a serious crime is a rare event that inevitably becomes a matter of
general notoriety. In the largest counties, where even homicides occur with regularity,
news of such crimes tends to get buried in a flurry of other events.
83

See Andrea Ford and Daryl Kelley, King Case To Be Tried In Ventura County, Los
ANGELES TIMES, Nov. 27, 1991, at A3; Adrianne Goodman, NAACP Official Criticizes
Venue Change in King Case, Los ANGELES TIMEs, Dec. 5, 1992, at B3.
84

See Richard Perez-Pena, Judgein Police-BeatingTrial Sets Aside Confusion, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 6, 1992, at B8.
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that county size is a critical factor. 85 In the appeals examined herein venue is
more likely to be changed in counties with populations under 250,000 (small
counties). Venue was changed in nine small counties and in three large
counties. Of the twenty cases where venue was not changed, all had
populations of 250,000 or over, except for Priceand Adcox. In the two cases from
the "borderline" sized county of Tulare, venue was not changed. Many of the
large county cases, where venue was not changed, stated that publicity, even
where inflammatory, becomes diffuse and non-prejudiced jurors could be
found.8 6 In typical change of venue cases (i.e., from small to large counties) this
reasoning is good applied sociology.

85
VENUE CHANGED
C
Powell (CA 1991) P
Williams (SC 1983) P-NS
Martinez (SC 1981)
Young (CA 1981)
Corona (CA 1972)
Frazier (SC 1971)
Lansdown (CA 1970)
Clifton (CA 1970)
Tidwell (SC 1970) P
Fain (SC 1970)
Smith (CA 1969) P
Maine (SC 1968) P

t

Los Angeles
Placer
Placer
San Luis Obispo
Sutter
Santa Cruz
Kern
Humboldt
Lassen
Stanislaus
Los Angeles
Mendocino

Population or Rank
6.526 million*
117,000
106,500
105,400"*
42,000
123,800
343,300**
100,000
17,500
184,600
7,000,000+
51,200

VENUE NOT CHANGED
Fauber (SC 1992)
Howard (SC 1992)
Price (SC 1992)
Edwards (SC 1991)
Sully (SC 1991)
Cooper (SC 1991)
Jennings (SC 1991)
Daniels (SC 1991)
Gallego (SC 1990)
Douglas (SC 1990)
Coleman (SC 1989)
Hamilton (SC 1989) P-NS
Edelbacher (SC 1989)
Adcox (SC 1988)
Bonin (SC 1988)
Balderas (SC 1985)
Odle (SC 1983)
Harris (SC 1981)
Manson (CA 1976)
Bunnell (SC 1975)

Ventura
Tulare
Humboldt
Orange
San Mateo
San Diego
Fresno
Riverside
Contra Costa
Orange
Sonoma
Tulare
Fresno
Tuolumne
Orange
Kern
Contra Costa
San Diego
Los Angeles
Santa Clara

619,300
253,000
108,024
2nd largest
I Ith largest
1,304,800"*
580,200
600,000+
9th largest
2,000,000
299,681
250,000
551,200
36,555
2,000,000
405,600
666,000
1,304,800"
6,993,371
992,100"*

California Supreme Court
CA = California Court of Appeals; SC
P = political factor issue; NS = political issue not significant
* Estimate of size of jury pool
Population not mentioned; pop. in 1968, Whittaker v. Superior Court, 438 P.2d 358, 370
(Cal. 1968)
86

See, e.g., People v. Douglas, 788 P.2d 640 (Cal. 1990), cert. denied sub norn. Douglas

v. California, 498 U.S. 1110 (1991).
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Although the California courts have not usually favored venue changes from
large counties, we cannot rely on this reasoning alone since a totality of the
circumstances methodology is required. An examination of Powell's
circumstances compels an examination of the political factor as it meshed with
statewide publicity.
Status and Prominence of Victim. Cases where change of venue turned on
victim status or prominence typically involved highly sympathetic figures, like
a murdered physician and family, an abandoned four year old child, or
well-liked teens senselessly murdered. 87 Rodney King was not a prominent
figure before the time of the videotaped assault. As compared to Odle, where
an officer killed in the line of duty trying to apprehend James Richard Odle,
whom "by virtue of the events and media coverage after the crimes, became a
posthumous celebrity," Rodney King's fame and standing-descended from the
nature of the case. 88 It was his transformed status, not his inherent prominence,
that weighed in the change of venue equation. The court of appeals concluded
that other factors overshadowed this one, but the critical factor, for purposes
of finding an impartial jury, was the public creation Rodney King had become.
As a result of immense publicity the name "Rodney King" became an icon and
in the popular mind the incident and prosecution became the Rodney King case.
As with the gravity of the crime factor, the importance of Rodney King was not
who he was before the chase and beating, but what he became to others
afterwards: an everyman in racially tainted police brutality cases.
If the Rodney King case hinged on anything, it hinged on race. Several cases
ordered venue changes because of the fear that black or Hispanic defendants
who were strangers in all-white rural counties would likely be confronted by
hostile jurors,8 9 where venue was not changed in cases involving minority
defendants, the courts took pains to explain that the defendant's minority
status was not a factor. 90 A reverse situation existed in Powell, with a black victim
of the brutality of white police officers. This factor gave the case its special force
for public controversy. The court utilized this circumstance to bolster its
decision to change venue by noting that in a Los Angeles Times poll of county
residents two-thirds believed that the force used by the officers was racially

87
Williams v. Superior Court, 688 P.2d 799 (Cal. 1983) (involving a murder-rape
victim who was a virgin); Frazier v. Superior Court, 486 P.2d 694 (Cal. 1971) (involving
a physician and his family); Fain v. Superior Court, 465 P.2d 23 (Cal. 1970) (involving
well-liked teens in a small county); Lansdown v. Superior Court, 89 Cal. Rptr. 154, 604
(Cal. Ct. App. 1970) (involving the abandonment of a four year old child).
88
0dle v. Superior Court, 654 P.2d 225, 229 (Cal. 1982). Unlike the officer's
posthumous fame, Rodney King's renown was not limited to the "western portion of
the county where the crimes took place." The fame, of course, was nationwide.
89
Williams v. Superior Court, 668 P.2d 799 (Cal. 1983); Martinez v. Superior Court,
629 P.2d 502 (Cal. 1981).

90People v. Coleman, 768 P.2d 32 (Cal. 1984) cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1038 (1990);
Martinez v. Superior Court, 629 P.2d 502 (Cal. 1981); Williams v. Superior Court, 668
P.2d 799 (Cal. 1983).
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motivated. 91 Perhaps the court analogized this case to those of black
defendants in rural white counties. But the analogy is far from perfect. Los
Angeles is demographically and culturally heterogenous; the police officers
would have been tried in a venue where whites were still a majority.92 Unlike
Martinez and Williams the defendants were not strangers or outsiders.
Whatever angry words may have been said by African-Americans before the
trial, the kind of uniform racial hostility noted by the courts in those cases was
not the situation in Los Angeles. And the Los Angeles Times poll results may
have been simply a logical and appropriate inference to be drawn from
observing the videotape on television rather than the. result of inflamed
anti-white racial hostility. In any event, the court never asked itself what the
"raw data" of the videotaped beatings, played over and over on television
stations throughout the state and nation, might mean to viewers outside Los
Angeles in regard to the racial elements of the case.
Status and Prominenceof Defendants. Powell collapsed two factors, status of
the victim and status of the accused, into one brief section of two paragraphs,
noting that "[i]mportant and unusual factors in this case are the status of the
defendants as White law enforcement officers and the arrestee as a Black ...."93
Young v. SuperiorCourt94 concerned a rogue cop who solicited two other officers
to fly "to small towns throughout California, holding up motels, taking but not
95
returning hostages, and killing any police officers who may get in the way."
In ordering a change of venue the court noted: "There is a danger that San Luis
Obispo County jurors may feel subtle psychological pressure to purge
corruption from a local department to which they must look for protection
against crime."96 This concern, standing alone, militates in favor of a change of
venue and resonated in Powell:
It cannot be disputed that difficulty in obtaining a fair trial in Los
Angeles County is exacerbated by the fact the defendants are police
officers, sworn to protect citizens, to uphold the law and to maintain
peace in the community. Their status is the basis of the intense coverage
and repeated showing of the videotape. The fact that the videotape
depicts local officers in such conduct threatens the community's ability
and has caused a high level of indignation,
to rely on its police
97
outrage, and anxiety.

91
Powell v. Superior Ct., 283 Cal. Rptr. 777, 783 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991) (almost
two-thirds polled believed the force used was racially motivated).
92
See supra note 5.
93

Powell, 283 Cal. Rptr. at 784-85.

94178 Cal. Rptr. 394 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981).
95

1d. at 395.

96

1d. at 396.

97

Powell, 283 Cal. Rptr at 785.
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This may be so, but the unique concatenation of circumstances occurring in
America's media center transformed this instance of police brutality from a
local case into a national scandal. The defendants' status as white police officers
also had significance to people outside Los Angeles. The case may have raised
fair trial concerns within Los Angeles, but impartiality was not to be found by
waving a change-of-venue magic wand. The extent to which the explosive
combination of race and police brutality transformed this case will be taken up
in the combined analysis below.
PoliticalFactors.Maine, California's fountainhead change of venue case, laid
the foundation for political factors. 98 The prosecutor apparently removed the
trial judge because they were rivals in a forthcoming election. Espousing a
strong legal ethic, the court declared: "Political factors have no place in a
criminal proceeding, and when they are likely to appear, as here, they constitute
an independent reason for change."99 Some subsequent cases cited the absence
of political factors as a reason for denying a change of venue.100 Political factors
have weighed in favor of venue changes when much ado was made over trial
costs in small counties.lOl The California Supreme Court in Harrisrejected the
argument that a tussle between local and federal prosecutors over who would
first try a case was a political factor.102 But in Smith, the fact that a bribery
defendant was a Los Angeles mayoral appointee, indicted during the mayor's
reelection campaign, was found to weigh in favor of a venue change. 10 3
The court of appeals found controlling similarity between Powell and Smith.
The defendants in both cases were Los Angeles public officials and the charges
involved dereliction of official duties that would be of concern to local
citizens. 104 The similarities, however, are outweighed by the differences for the
purpose of determining whether a change of venue would produce an
impartial jury. The political dispute in Smith was mainly between the mayor
and the Los Angeles Times, which uncovered the story and was responsible for
keeping it in the limelight. It appears that most of the publicity in Smith was
local to Los Angeles, although the newspaper's award of a Pulitzer Prize for

98
Maine v. Superior Court, 438 P.2d 372 (Cal. 1968); People v. Harris, 623 P.2d 240
(Cal. 1981), cert. denied sub non. Harris v. California, 454 U.S. 882 (1981). See also cases
cited supra note 55.
99

Maine, 438 P.2d at 386-87.

10OPeople v. Hamilton, 774 P.2d 730 (Cal. 1989) cert. denied sub non. Hamilton v.
California 494 U.S. 1039 (1990); Williams v. Superior Court, 668 P.2d 799 (Cal. 1983).
101
See Frazier v. Superior Court, 486 P.2d 694 (Cal. 1971); People v. Tidwell, 473 P.2d
748 (Cal. 1970).
102
People v. Harris, 623 P.2d 240. (Bird, C.J., dissenting, felt that it was a political
factor).
103

Smith v. Superior Court, 80 Cal. Rptr. 693 (Cal. Ct. App. 1969).
[d. at 694.

104
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its reporting of the scandal gave it some national attention. 105 Smith concluded
that "the news media coverage .

.

. has been so pervasive that there is a

reasonable likelihood that the petitioner cannot get a fair trial in Los Angeles
County."106 The court rejected the prosecutor's argument that "crimes against
the taxpayer" would not influence a jury as much as a violent crime and noted
that the voir dire indicated elements of prejudice among jurors as a result of
the publicity. It does not seem that the award of a Pulitzer Prize to the Los
Angeles Times made Harvey Smith the same kind of national symbol as Rodney
King. In Smith there is no indication that venues outside Los Angeles were
poisoned to the same extent as the county of original venue. The change of
venue was therefore defendable under the impartiality paradigm.
Powell clearly departs from Smith in significant ways, including the violence,
the vivid and gripping taped images, the racial element, and the massive
publicity on a worldwide scale. The Powell court acutely detailed the intense
and riveting political controversy that erupted after the beatings. A
monumental power struggle ensued, involving moves by Mayor Bradley, a
longtime rival of Chief Gates, to have him removed, city council elections,
public personages taking sides, charges flung at the Los Angeles police and
Gates' leadership, the formation of an investigatory commission which
recommended Gates' removal and sweeping changes, and shakeups within the
Police Department. This political activity continued for most of the year so it
undoubtedly had a continuing effect on the opinion of potential jurors. Such
political aspects of the case clearly transcended that which existed in Maine.
The court concluded:
While we recognize that the incident and some of its ramifications
have received widespread publicity elsewhere, the impact on residents
of Los Angeles is unquestionably much greater because of the
unabated and acrimonious total involvement of city officials and local
community leaders. There is no doubt that these political biases would
1 07
invade the jury box if the case were tried in Los Angeles County.
This plausible conclusion nevertheless was not a proper foundation for
changing venue. While the political activities that followed the beating were
pronounced and must have been known by potential jurors, it is also the case
that an intense national political debate paralleled that of Los Angeles. The
national debate was no less political than that of Los Angeles, although in a
different way.
C. Rethinking the Change of Venue Decision in Powell
The heart of Powell's six-factor analysis is that the political elements of the
case made it different from other notorious cases. On the surface, the reasoning
10SId. at 696.
10

6vd.

107powell v. Superior Court, 283 Cal. Rptr. 777, 787 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991).
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is plausible. In a case like Manson or Corona, where the crime consists of a
gruesome murder which has been broadcast extensively throughout the state,
one can argue that the emotional reaction of jurors in one county will be close
to that of jurors in another. People in the original county may apprehend a
special fear from a terrible crime that occurred close to home, but the crime
produces a universal sense of revulsion. 108 Where a crime is special because it
touches on intensely local and political issues, however, locals may feel about
the case in ways that outsiders do not, even if the case has been widely
publicized.
However plausible this reasoning, there were aspects of the Rodney King
case that transformed it from one of local interest to a case that had universal
meaning for Americans in the year between the viewing of the beating tapes
and the trial. The court's cursory review of the five "non-political" factors was
essentially dismissive of them. Its eager rush to embrace the political factor was
a misuse of discretion. Where venue lies is a technical issue that can be
evaluated as a matter of law.109 A change of venue decision, on the other hand,
is inherently a matter of discretion, often fraught with uncertainty, requiring a
court to balance several factors to determine which location offers the best site
for a fair trial. A discretionary judgment is not beyond evaluation. California's
standard of a reasonable likelihood that a fair and impartial trial cannot be had
in the county, like the more common abuse of discretion standard, 110 does not
establish a hard and fast legal rule, despite the court of appeals' attemptto make
it appear so. 111 Powell chose to rely on the highly charged political situation
and on the statute to make it appear that its decision was compelled. By failing
to penetrate its assumptions, when all the circumstances of the case were so
unusual that stereotypical approaches were not appropriate, the opinion failed
to rise to the occasion provided by the Rodney King affair.
What made the change of venue decision in Powell a futile search for a
perfectly impartial jury was (1) the phenomenal amount of national publicity
about this case, (2) the changing nature of television coverage even in the last
five to ten years, and (3) the extent to which the case touched a sensitive political
nerve in every corner of America.

108People v. Gacy, 468 N.E.2d 1171 (Il. 1984) cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1037 (1985); People
v. Speck, 242 N.E.2d 208 (Ill. 1968) (permitting change from Cook County); Corona v.
Superior Court, 101 Cal. Rptr. 411 (Cal. Ct. App. 1972) (moving venue from small
county).
109
See, e.g., Williams v. State, 383 So. 2d 547 (Ala. 1979) (holding that there was proper
venue in bribery case properly in county where defendant never performed a single act
of bribery where a coconspirator performed acts in furtherance of the crime).
11 0
Guthrie, supra note 13, describes cases under the abuse of discretion standard and
the California standard in § 6.
111
See supra note 40 and accompanying text. The court softened this appearance by
obliquely acknowledging the rule of Manson by stating: "[w]e emphasize, however, that
were this simply a matter of extraordinary publicity we might have reached a different
conclusion." Powell, 283 Cal. Rptr. at 779.
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The Extent of National Publicity. Competing ideas about the way to deal with
cases beset by national publicity are found in the California Court of Appeals
cases of Corona,112 where a venue change was ordered and Manson113 where it
was not. Both mass murder cases were covered by the national news media,
with Manson arguably the more riveting case. 114 It is possible to distinguish the
cases on their circumstances, especially Corona'ssmall county of original venue
compared to the Los Angeles venue of Manson.115 Corona creates a problem by
the absolute nature of its language, which does not fit all cases, and is misleading taken out of context.1 16 Corona referred to the "massive outpouring of
incriminatory publicity in the commercial news media and the potential
intrusion of community involvement external to the judicial process" as factors
1 17
making it reasonably likely that a fair trial could not be had in Sutter County.
That case concluded that in "counties geographically removed from the locale
of the crime, lack of a sense of community involvement will permit jurors a
degree of objectivity unattainable in that locale."118 The context for these
statements was an interesting insight in communal psychology advanced by
the court:
Twenty-five slayings took place [in Sutter County] without a ripple of
public awareness. To some extent the community's reputation for
peace and serenity will depend on a solution of the mystery.
Understandably sensitive to community reputation, local jurors will
involvement transcending their strict
feel a sense of community
119
juridical function.
Residents of a small, rural county, with a population of only 42,000, may indeed
feel a sense of personal responsibility at the existence of a mass murderer in
their midst that a resident of an urban area, with its higher level of anonymity,
may not. This could, indeed, translate back into subtle pressure on the jurors
to end their locale's shame by finding that this defendant is the guilty party.
1 12

Corona v. Superior Court, 101 Cal. Rptr. 411 (Cal. Ct. App. 1972).

113People v. Manson, 132 Cal. Rptr. 265 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976).
114 Television of the Corona case showed workers unearthing a mass grave in a wooded
area; the Manson case, though involving fewer victims, was more lurid, with stories
about the blood stained walls, and the special attractiveness of one victim, a well-liked
movie star who was pregnant at the time of her death.
l1SAs we noted above, by basing its holding exclusively on the political factor, Powell
implicitly adopted the Manson approach that there comes a point where publicity is so
extensive that to move the case becomes an exercise in futility. See supranotes 65-70 and
accompanying text.
1 16
See use of lengthy quote from Corona in Powell v. Superior Court, 283 Cal. Rptr.
777, 787 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991).
ll 7 Corona v. Superior Court, 101 Cal. Rptr. 411, 418 (Cal. Ct. App. 1972).
1 18
1 19

1d. at 419.
d. at 417-18.
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Thus contextualized, Corona is not good authority for changing venue
primarily on the basis of intense publicity. Its holding must properly include
all its salient facts, including the likely impact of a mass murder in such a small
county. Corona's language, if taken to its extreme, would support the
discredited argument that a highly publicized case must be dismissed, thus
immunizing people like Charles Manson and H.R. Haldeman. The judiciary
has a primary responsibility to try suspected criminals. As long as it has
eliminated its own defects that add to the impact of publicity, as called for in
Sheppard v. Maxwell, 12 0 a judicial system must go forward to do the best it can
in providing a fair trial in an imperfect world. In short, Powell's reliance 121on
Corona is misplaced.
If, then, massive statewide publicity is an argument against shifting venue,
it should be incumbent on a court to explore such facts where there is a fair
likelihood that publicity outside the county of venue has influenced the minds
of potential out-of-county jurors.122 Non-residents of Los Angeles who recall
the year between the first televised showing of the Rodney King videotape and
the verdict in Simi Valley are likely to recall the image of the beating vividly
because it was played incessantly on national television, both for its own
newsworthiness and as a backdrop to any story having to do with race relations
and the police. While we do not have an accounting of the number of times the
tape was shown on national networks and on local news stations across the
country, proxy evidence of the story's notoriety exists. In the immediate
aftermath of the televised beating, editorial comment, all of it critical of the Los
Angeles police, was to be found in newspapers in Albuquerque, Buffalo, N.Y.,
Chattanooga, Cleveland, Denver, Des Moines, Hackensack, N.J., Minneapolis,
Omaha, Pittsburgh, Portland, Ore., Rockford, Ill., San Francisco, Syracuse, N.Y.,
Worster, Mass., and in the ChristianScience Monitor.123 A PhiladelphiaInquirer
120384 U.S. 333 (1966).
12 1

powell v. Superior Court, 283 Cal. Rptr. 777, 787-88 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991).

122

See supra note 74 and accompanying text.

123

The editorials listed are found in 22 EDITORIALS ON FILE 284-87 Mar. 1-15, 1991:
ALBUQUERQUE JOURNAL, Mar. 8, 1991 ("Ten Los Angeles policemen did more in two
minutes to damage respect for law enforcement than have uncounted allegations of
police brutality over many years."); THE BUFFALO NEWS,Mar. 9, 1991 ("'It looked like
something that came out of South Africa.'"); THE CHATTANOOGA TIMES, Mar. 11, 1991
THE
("Seen on national news programs, the beating outraged the nation . . .");
(CLEVELAND) PLAIN DEALER, Mar. 11, 1991 (".... officials have shown little outrage and
even less inclination to vigorously pursue long-standing allegations that Los Angeles
police routinely brutalize minorities."); THE DENVER POST, Mar. 7, 1991 ("Americans
were horrified by the image on their TV screens Tuesday night ...");DES MOINES
REGISTER, Mar. 9, 1991 ('The tape was turned over to CNN, which broadcast it."); THE
(HACKENSACK, N.J.) RECORD, Mar. 13, 1991 ("The whole national will be watching to see
what happens to the Los Angeles police officers...); MINNEAPOLIS STAR AND TRIBUNE,
Mar. 15, 1991 ("... law enforcement personnel be held to the highest standards of
discipline and accountability."); OMAHA WORLD-HERALD, Mar. 10, 1991 ("...exceeded
any reasonable, humane limits."); THE PITTSBURGH PRESS, Mar. 10, 1991 ("...repulsive
.. "); THE (PORTLAND) OREGONIAN, Mar. 9, 1991 ("... reminiscent of the worst police
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cartoon of helmeted L.A.P.D. officers beating a person in a fetal position on the
ground had Darryl Gates saying, "These Black people are so self-destructive.
Time after time they run into our night sticks." 124 Later in the year, editorial
comment was made either directly about the case or on related issues in
newspapers in Atlanta, Chicago, Houston, New York, San Francisco, Seattle,
125
Washington, D.C., and in a conservative national opinion magazine.
National columnists Anna Quindlen and Tom Wicker were moved to
comment. 12 6 The conservative National Review compared the case to police
woes in England. 12 7 A political cartoon critical of a tough Portland, Ore.
jaywalking ordinance caused a minor furor by portraying local cops beating a
jaywalker the way Los Angeles police beat Rodney King.12 8 Gossip columnist
Liz Smith worked an item about Rodney King into a story.129 Former New York
Police Commissioner Lee Brown offered an op-ed column on how the case
affected proposals for civilian police review. 130 In national magazines annual
wrap-ups of the events of 1991 put the Rodney King case before Operation
Desert Storm. 13 1 Mention of the case seemed a natural lead-in to a trade

abuses during the civil rights marches of the 1960s... ");
ROCKFORD (ILL.) REGISTER STAR,
Mar. 11, 1991 ("Punishment for officers should be swift and sure."); THE (SAN FRANCISCO)
SUN REPORTER, Mar. 13, 1991 (".. . savagery... ");
SYRACUSE (N.Y.) HERALD-JOURNAL,

Mar. 8, 1991 (".. . videotape was shown over and over again on television news
programs."); THE (WORSTER, MASS.) EvENING GAZETTE, Mar. 12, 1991 (". . . a police
'wilding'..."; and in THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, Mar. 15, 1991 ("... a systemwide

examination of police methods and ethics is in order.").
12422 EDITORIALS ON FILE 287, Mar. 1-15, 1991.
125 Jeff Dickerson, Duke, Buchanan Seek Only to Exploit Woes, ATLANTA JOURNAL AND
CONSTITUTION, Nov. 21,1991, at A8; L.A. law: born to be wild?, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, July 13,

1991, at 20; Mary E. Conn & Alan Ellis, ConstitutionalCops Fighting Freedom's Battles,
HOUSTON CHRONICLE, Oct. 28, 1991, at A13; David C. Anderson, EditorialNotebook: The
L.A.P.D.'s Thin, Savage Blue Line, N. Y. TIMES, at sec. 4, p. 16, col. 1; Arthur Hoppe, How
to Get Arrested, SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE, July 12, 1991, at A23; Don Williamson, How
to Break the Chain of Violence, SEATTLE TIMES, Aug. 13, 1991, at A6; Who Polices the Police?,
WASHINGTON POST, Sept. 24, 1991, at A22; Thugs With Badges, Los Angeles Police Beating
of Rodney King, NATIONAL REVIEW, Apr. 1, 1991, at 16.
126
Anna Quindlen, Public &Private: The Good Guys, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 12, 1992, atA25,
col. 5; Tom Wicker, In the Nation: Hanging Tough in L.A., N. Y. TIMES, July 11, 1991, at

A21, col. 5.
127 Editorial, Law breakers and law makers; Rodney King; Birmingham Six, NATIONAL
REVIEW, April 15, 1991, at 11.

128 John Leo, Smothering controversialnews, U.S.NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Sept. 23, 1991,
at 24.
12 9 Liz Smith, Mort and the DalaiLama, NEWSDAY, May 17, 1991, at 11.
130
Lee P. Brown, Police Don't Need Another Bill of Rights, WASHINGTON POST, Sept. 24,
1991, at A23.
131

From survivor Sandra Dee to unlucky motorist Rodney King, we revisit'someof the year's
memorable subjects, PEOPLE, Dec. 30, 1991, at 106; Ground wars, U.S. NEWS & WORLD
REPORT, Dec. 30, 1991, at 92.
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magazine article on racism in music. 132 We have little doubt that were a firm
hired to collate evidence of television, radio and newspaper comments on the
case throughout California, that evidence of news saturation would have been
found, even if not to the degree in the Los Angeles metropolitan area.133
More significantly, in recognition of the unusual and highly charged
emotional nature of the videotape, the print media referred incessantly to this
factor and to the national impact of the case: "Fortuitously videotaped by a
bystander, the beating was memorably broadcast on television all over this
country and abroad;"1 34 "Since it first aired a year ago, the brutal scene of Los
Angeles policemen beating motorist Rodney King senseless has been replayed
hundreds of times;" 13 5 "Every American has the right to a fair trial; but what if
most of the country thinks it has witnessed the accused committing the crime?
. .. The scenes [of the King beating] were shown repeatedly on national
television;" 13 6 "The impact of the LAPD video is being felt in courts and precinct
houses across the country;"13 7 "The videotaped beating of Rodney King
shocked the nation;" 138 "Within a few days, as Holliday's indelible images
began to appear again and again on network news shows, the entire country
recoiled in horror. The Los Angeles Times called the tape 'America's Ugliest
Home Video;"' 139 "The scandal reverberated far beyond Los Angeles, stirring
a nationwide debate over excessive police violence and finally prompting

13 2

Freddee Towles, Racism Persistsin Music Biz, BILLBOARD, June 29, 1991, at 12.
133polls conducted after the May 1992 riots indicate a virtually universal awareness
of the case. Robin Toner, After the Riots; Los Angeles Riots Are a Warning,Americans Fear,
N.Y. TIMES, May 11, 1992, at Al, col. 3 (New York Times/CBS News Poll indicated that
over 90% of black and white respondents had opinion onwhether the riots were warning
to nation or isolated incident); Richard Morin, Polls Uncover Much Common Ground on
L.A. Verdict, THE WASHINGTON POST, May 11, 1992, atA15 ("86 percent of the whites and
100 percent of the blacks interviewed by USA Today said the verdict was 'wrong.'");
Riots In Los Angeles; Scant Supportfor Verdict or Rioting, N.Y. TIMES, May 3, 1992, at sec.
1, p. 26, col. 5 (Reporting that a NEWSWEEK poll indicated 93% of black respondents and
74% of whites disagreed with acquittals); Views On the King Verdict; Washington
Post-ABCNews Poll, THE WASHINGTONPOST, May 3, 1992, atA26 (Washington Post-ABC
News Poll indicated that 92% of blacks and 64% of whites believed that the officers were
guilty).
134
Paul Chevigny, Let's Make It a Federal Case; Police Brutality, THE NATION, Mar. 23,
1992, at 370.
135
American Notes; Trials; Tale of the Tape, TIME, Mar. 16, 1992, at 33.
36
1 policing; Black and Blue, THE ECONOMIST, Mar. 7, 1992, at 30.
13 7James N. Baker, Los Angeles Aftershocks, NEWSWEEK, Apr. 1, 1991, at 18.
13 8
Susan Yocurn, Why It Happened: An L.A. Cop's View, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 25, 1991, at
34.
13 9
Bill Hewett, et al., When L.A. Cops FuriouslyBeat a Black Motorist, They Didn't Know
They Were on GeorgeHolliday's Candid Camera, PEOPLE, Mar. 25, 1991, at 83.
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Washington to take action."14° All this does not prove that there was more
publicity outside of Los Angeles than inside. It does demonstrate that the
amount of publicity outside the county, much of it in the most emotional form
of televised beatings, was so pervasive that there was a reasonable likelihood
that potential jurors outside Los Angeles would have heard about and formed
opinions about the case.
A final point is that in this case venue was moved to a county contiguous to
Los Angeles. The California practice on interlocutory appeals is to order the
trial court to make the decision, and in this case the judge chose the venue from
among three counties with available courts named by the California's Judicial
Council. 14 1 Even if there were some belief that a trial in a rural northern
California county, or a metropolitan county in the San Francisco Bay area,
might have removed the case from its immediate political milieu and the same
level of media impact, it is clear that the trial's proximity to Los Angeles raised
the effective level of publicity and its impact to that of Los Angeles. 142 Given
the extent to which political news of central cities still tend to dominate the
news in suburbs, we suspect that the actual jurors were as immersed in the
politics of the case as Los Angelinos. 143 In contrast, Illinois courts which have
moved venue have taken pains to "buffer" the trial county from the county of
original venue. 144
The Changing Natureand Impact of the News Media. The court in Powell avoided

a direct confrontation with Manson,14 5 and based its decision to change the
venue on the local political fallout of Rodney King's beating. The Powell court
indirectly acknowledged that news media attention in some cases can have so
great an impact outside the county of venue as to render a change of venue
useless. However, the court failed to acknowledge the enormous growth of
news programming intrusion and intensity and changes in style in only the last
few years. Over the past five years "American mass media have changed

140

Alex Prud'homme, Police Brutality Four Los Angeles officers are arrestedfor a vicious
beating, and the country plunges intoa debate on the rise of complaintsagainstcops, TIME, Mar.
25, 1991, at 16.
14 1

See supra note 26.

14 2

Seth Mydans, Officers' Assault Trial Nears Opening, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 2, 1992, at B8,
col. 1. ("Simi Valley residents see the same television programs and read similar
newspapers as residents of Los Angeles... ").
14 3
polls conducted after the riots in suburban Orange County found that 22% of the
population agreed with the verdicts, compared to 13% in Los Angeles County.

Tammerlin Drummond, Times OrangeCounty Poll; LA.-Style Riots Likely in O.C., Majority
Believe, Los ANGELES TIMEs, May 22, 1992, at Al, col. 5.
14 4 People v. Johnson, 499 N.E.2d 1355, 1358-59 (111. 1986).
145132 Cal. Rptr. 265 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976) cert. denied, 430 U.S. 986 (1977).
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significantly...."146 New technologies have created a "new age of personalized
mass media."147 In the news business, "noteworthy advances" have been made:
on three fronts: news gathering, news processing, and news
dissemination. Access to computer data bases and satellites has put an
enormous store of usable information within range of average
newspeople wherever they may be.... When it comes to distribution,
the array of available channels for immediate or delayed transmission
has multiplied far beyond
the range deemed possible a scant
148
twenty-five years ago.
This trend has been abetted by the explosion of cable TV, found in half of
America's households by 1987.149 The competition from the round-the-clock
news programming from CNN may have made broadcast television news lean
even more to the visual and the shocking than was previously the case. 150 In
television news "sensational and novel occurrences drown out news of more
lasting significance" and stories tend to stress "trivial aspects of serious stories"
often by personalizing them. 151 More people, as we are reminded by TV
advertising, "get their news from television." As a result, what television does
best-"transmitting realism and emotional appeal" 152-- has increased.
This phenomenon can produce divergent trends. On the one hand, the
growth of cable TV creates a more fragmented viewing public. Although at
certain moments, what has been called "total television" creates a "new form of
media reality ... [T]otal TV was born in certain mesmeric moments in the

eighties when the whole nation seemed to have been mobilized at couchside
to stare at the same images across many channels." 153 For example:
Starting with the Iran hostage crisis of 1979-81 and running through
the Gulf War, these glimpses of total TV generally had the theme of
America or Americans held hostage-most humiliatingly in Iran; most
tragically in various terrorist plane-nappings and murders; most
14 6

DoRis A. GRABER, MASS MEDIA AND AMERICAN POLrrIcs xiii (3d ed. 1989)

14 7

1d. at 373.

14 8

1d. at 374-5.

14 9

1d. at 378.

150The selection of news is not a neutral process that matches the political or social
importance of the stories. The five most important factors used in selecting news stories
are: (1) strong audience impact; (2) violence (natural or man-made), disasters, and
scandals (people remember violent more than non-violent behavior); (3) familiar
situations (e.g., attention to "celebrities"); (4) local events; and (5) timely and novel events.
"Among these five basic criteria, conflict, proximity, and timeliness are most important."
Id. at 84-6 (emphasis in original).
15 1

1d. at 96.

15 21d. at 148.
153

Tom Engelhardt, The Gulf War as Total Television, THE NATION, May 11, 1992, at 613.
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pathetically in the Challenger disaster, in which a schoolteacher's life
was hostaged to the failure of American technology; most absurdly in
the little girl hostaged to the elements by her fall down a well shaft in
kissing American
Texas; most triumphantly in the images of students
54
soil after their ostensible rescue from Grenada.
In the Rodney King case Americans were held hostage not by irrational foreign
foes or by accidental forces, but by the accumulated pain and ambiguities of
the dilemma of race. This new media trend is driven in part by economics,
which has led networks to sharply pare their news staffs. So, when a highly
visual story like the King beating arises, national and local broadcast television
1 55
is more than eager to play the story to the hilt.
It is hard to underestimate the impact of "total television" on the attitudes of
Americans. In a special Newsweek feature on television it was noted that
"watching TV has become What We Do. On a typical day, the average American
spends no less than seven hours and five minutes in front of the screen." 156 The
controversy over TV watching includes an indeterminate debate as to what
extent our social ills can be laid at television's door. Much of television's impact
is evanescent although cumulatively the images "added up to the kind of
commonality of experience that binds a heterogeneous people."'157 Television,
then, does have the ability to produce a unified social sense of community158when
a high proportion of the public watches a single show, event, or series.
These trends were powerfully abetted by the large number of personal video
cameras owned and used by the general public. This easy form of making
instant "home videos" has become so widespread that a popular television
show emerged replaying them. In a very short time it has become clear that
"private citizens with camcorders are now part of the news gathering
process" 159 and a useful adjunct to law enforcement. In the post-trial L.A. riots
prosecutors have examined 329 tapes made by individuals.
"[L]aw-enforcement investigations in general have been transformed by the
rapid spread of amateur videotapes like the famous tape of the police beating
"160
of Rodney G. King ....

15 4/d.
15 5

1d.

6

15 Harry F. Waters, The Future of Television, NEWSWEEK, October 17, 1988, at 84.
157

1d.

15 8

"Remember those eight nights in 1977 when virtually the entire nation sat
transfixed by 'Roots'? Television has, for better or worse, made America look at itself."
Id.
159John Leo, Gadgetry's power and peril, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, April, 15, 1991,
at 20.
16OSeth Mydans, In Los Angeles Riots, a Witness With Videotapes, N.Y. TIMES, July 31,
1992, at B7, col. 1.
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None of these trends of professional and private media coverage are
unknown to persons, including judges, who are aware of modem social trends.
In Powell the court took judicial notice of the news media coverage, even though
some news items were not entered into evidence by the parties, for the purpose
of evaluating "the likelihood pretrial publicity has prejudiced a defendant's
right to a fair trial in the county of original venue.... "161 The court avoided
discussing the fact that the amount of publicity outside Los Angeles was so
extensive as to saturate potential jurors throughout the state.
The Political Meaning of the National Publicity - The Politics of Race. The
combined effect of the massive publicity of the beating and the ability of
television to intrude on people's consciousness to establish a national focus of
attention, does not entirely undermine Powell's reasoning. This combined effect
does raise a threshold question about the impartiality of a jury outside Los
Angeles compared to those within Los Angeles. In some cases the venue of a
local political case, under the impartiality paradigm, should be changed.162 On
the other hand, there are some cases, such as the Watergate trials and the trial
of Sirhan Sirhan,163 where the case is invariably touched by political
considerations and where interest is inherently national. 164 In these cases, the
place of the crime is fortuitous and a change of venue is useless (if it is useless,
it can't achieve fairness), at least where the jury pool in the county of venue is
large enough to draw jurors who pass the test of practical impartiality on voir
dire.
The political meaning of Powell was as weighty and as political outside Los
Angeles as within the county. It is true that political actors within Los Angeles,
including the mayor, the police chief, the appointed commission to investigate
the police, and other elected officials were active and vocal and that this had
an impact on potential jurors. However, as the California cases make clear, a
"political factor" is not limited to the election of the contending attorneys
in a
prosecution, as was the case in Maine.165
The national political impact of the acquittals was evidenced by the alacrity
with which presidential candidates responded to them and to the subsequent
riots. President Bush's first public comments sounded "wishy-washy" and left

161

Powell v. Superior Court, 283 Cal. Rptr. 777, 779 n.2 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992) (citing
People v. Jurado, 171 Cal.Rptr. 509 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981)).
162

Smith v. Superior Court, 80 Cal. Rptr. 693 (Cal. Ct. App. 1969).
Sirhan Sirhan assassinated Robert Kennedy at the height of Kennedy's 1968
presidential primary campaign.
164
United States v. Haldeman, 559 F.2d 31 (D.C. Cir. 1976); People v. Sirhan, 497 P.2d
1121 (Cal. 1972) cert. denied,410 U.S. 947(1973). These issues raise fundamental questions
of justice: should, for example, the victorious Allies after World War II have refrained
from trying German leaders for war crimes and crimes against humanity because of the
notoriety of the case, among other legal impedimenta? See ANNTUSA & JOHN TusA, THE
163

NUREMBERG TRIAL (1983); JUDITH SHKLAR, infra note 215.
16 5

Powell, 283 Cal. Rptr. at 786-87.
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some advisors concerned that the President's words "almost made the rioting

sound justified." 166 This led to frantic meetings with speechwriters resulting in
a "new statement [that] had a sharper edge, condemning 'the wanton
destruction of property and the senseless death of several citizens,'" thus
16 7
putting the President "on firmer (and familiar Republican) ground."
Meanwhile, Governor Clinton, the Democratic standardbearer, found in the
riots an issue to break out of the "character issue "168 impasse and the occasion,
after a few days of hesitancy, to "deliver a long, powerful speech in
Birmingham, Alabama, attempting to harmonize law and order and social
justice, toughness and compassion."1 69
The political meaning of the riots transcended the amount of violence. From
the beginning the Rodney King case was about race. The politics of race
continues to be the great subtext of all specific domestic political issues in
America, as it has been since the pre-Civil War sectional crisis. The Powell court
could not exorcise race as a factor by shifting the venue. In retrospect the venue
change made matters worse. The particular racial elements of the case,
involving egregious and racially tinged, if not racially motivated, police
brutality by white officers on a black man was the most explosive manifestation
of race hostility in contemporary America. It touched deep and sensitive nerves
not only in black communities but throughout America. Half forgotten in our
era was almost a century of rampant police-condoned lynchings of blacks
following emancipation, 170 compounded by a toleration of police brutality to
all lower class persons into the 1960s. 171 Police brutality and routine
harassment of blacks sparked the urban riots of the 1960s. 172 It may be true that
in the 1970s and 1980s "[a]rbitrary harassment and intimidation of blacks by
legal authorities... [has] greatly diminished, although there are regular reports
of such incidents." 173 The reason for this lies primarily in the growth of urban
166 Fred Barnes, Stunned; White House Watch - Rodney King Verdict Aftermath, THE NEW
REPUBLIC, May 25, 1992, at 14.

167id.
168Sidney Blumenthal, Firebell: Clinton and The Riot, THE NEW REPUBLIC, May 25,1992,
at 11.
16 9 1d.
1 70

See RALPH GINzBERG, 100 YEARS OF LYNCHING (1988); HOWARD SMEAD, BLOOD
JUSTICE (1986); WALTER FRANCIS WHITE, ROPE AND FAGGOTr (1929).
171

See ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, et al., THE THIRD DEGREE (1931); SAMUEL WALKER, A
CRITICAL HISTORY OF POLICE REFORM 9-11, 25-28, 69-70 (1977); WILLIAM A. WESTLEY,
VIOLENCE AND THE POLICE (1958).
172
See NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS (Kerner Commission),
REPORT (1968); NATIONAL COMMISSION ONTHE CAUSES AND PREVENTIONOF VIOLENCE, To
ESTABLISH JUSTICE, To INSURE DOMESTIC TRANQUILLITY (1969) (Eisenhower Commission);
J. CAMBELL, et al., LAW AND ORDER RECONSIDERED (1969).
173
GERALD DAVID JAYNES & ROBIN M. WILLIAMS, JR., EDS., A COMMON DESTINY:
BLACKS AND AMERICAN SOCIETY 14 (1989).
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black political power and the ensuing increase in minority representation on
police forces.1 74 In the 1980s, there have been many well publicized racially
related crimes and a growing belief in the existence of police brutality, which
kept the sensitivity of inner-city blacks to police harassment alive.175 The issue
was most volatile in Miami where at least three serious riots erupted during
the last decade in response to police killings of African-Americans. 1 76 Still, the
growth of a sizeable black middle class and the resulting isolation of poor
African-Americans has generated many grievances. A survey done in Los
Angeles in the early 1970s, for example, noted that residents:
demonstrated the existence in the black community of serious
grievances about police brutality, merchant exploitation, agency
discrimination, poor service agency performance, local white political
officials, and biases in white-managed communications media. These
varied in intensity but in each case sizeable minorities expressed them.
Each of the conventional mechanisms provided by our society to
redress such grievances-individual striving, normal administrative
procedures, conventional politics, and nonviolent protest-appeared
I
blocked to almost half the community.17
The salience of such issues for selecting jurors and the venue of trials is that
race consciousness pervades not only the black community but all American
communities. This is especially problematic in criminal cases. Many, for
example, believe the key to George Bush's election in 1988 was the barely veiled

174

1d. at 250.

17 5 See supranote 63; see, e.g., Binder & Fridell, Lethal Forceas a Police Response, 16 CRIM.
JUST. ABSTRACTS 250 (1984); Calm Prevailsas House Panel Looks intoNYC BrutalityCharges,
LAW ENFORCEMENT NEws, Oct. 10, 1983, at 17.
176
A major riot erupted in 1980 after white police officers were acquitted for beating
black motorcyclist and businessman, Arthur McDuffie, to death. B. PORTER & M. DUNN,
THE MIAMI RIOT OF 1980 (1984), cited in WILLIAM WILBANKS, THE MYTH OF A RACIST
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 2 (1987).
Miami police officer Luis Alvarez sparked two riots, once when he shot and killed
Nevell Johnson, Jr., a 20 year old African-American in December, 1982 and again in
March, 1984 when an all-white jury acquitted him of charges. See Reginald Stuart,
Policeman In Miami Is Acquitted By Jury in Slaying of Black, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 16, 1984, at
Al, col. 1; Reginald Stuart, Police Occupy Tense Areas in Miami After 300 Arrests, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 17,1984, at 6, col. 1. Three days of rioting followed the shooting and killing
of black motorcyclist Clement Lloyd and passenger Allan Blanchard by Colombian born
police officer William Lozano. See Lamar, A Brightly Colored Tinderbox, TIME, Jan. 30,
1989, at 28.
There is often uncertainty in counting civil disturbances. Newspapers have
referred to Miami experiencing three major riots in the last decade, Mike Clary, Police
in MiamiBracefor Violence, Los ANGELES TIMES, June 29,1991, atA16, and to experiencing
its fifth riot in a decadeJeanne DeQuine, 'Volatile'Miamia City Divided; Race Riot Revives
Fears,Frustrations,USA TODAY, Dec. 5, 1990, at 3A.
177
DAVID 0. SEARS & JOHN B. MCCONAHAY, THE POLITICS OF VIOLENCE 68 (1973), quoted
in JAYNES & WILLIAMS, supra note 173, at 131.
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use of race as a wedge issue in the notorious "Willie Horton" advertisement,
which clearly played on white fears of black criminals. 178 Given the virtual
certainty that juries outside and within Los Angeles would not have the same
racial composition, race would consequently matter very much in the verdict.
That race is an influential factor is not a matter of speculation. The most
comprehensive scientific review of data on the issue of race, by the National
Research Council of the National Academy of Sciences, concluded that in the
area of racial attitudes "race still matters greatly in the United States." 179
Although the attitudes of white Americans have changed substantially from
1940 to the 1980s to favor principlesof equality, white attitudes are less favorable
to implementation of egalitarian principles and exhibit considerable indicia of
social distance. 180 Black attitudes continue to display substantial distrust of
white intentions and of predominantly white institutions. The reported
findings indicate substantial differences between the races on a wide spectrum

178

See, e.g., George Bush and Willie Horton, N.Y. T]MES, Nov. 4, 1988, at A34, col. 1
(editorial); Mark Crispin Miller, Invisible Man; Alan Keyes' Campaign in Maryland, THE
NATION, Nov. 21, 1988, at 517.
179

JAYNES & WILLIAMS, supranote 173, at 155 (1989). This massive volume summarizes
hundreds of studies of substantive issues such as employment, health, political
participation, education, crime and criminal justice, as well as attitudes concerning race.
The work was conducted by a panel of distinguished academics and research associates.
180

This has been labeled the "new racism." Paul M. Sniderman, et al., The New Racism,
35 AM. J.POL. Sci. 423 (1991) [hereinafter New Racism]. In a survey of white respondents
in the San Francisco-Oakland Bay area in 1986, using a combination of survey and
experimental methods, the study found that conservatives are less likely than whites to
favor government support for the disadvantaged, that conservatives are more likely to
support assistance for "worthy" distressed blacks than "worthy" distressed whites, that
both liberals and conservative favor governmental equal opportunity measures for
women over blacks, and that low educational achievement is a salient predictor of
anti-black assistance attitudes. This exploration of the "new racism" punctures the
assumption that political conservatism is associated with racism, but also confirms both
broadly held views that disfavor assistance to blacks by liberals and conservatives and
suggests that there are socio-economic correlates among whites with lower classes being
more hostile to black preferment.
Kluegel, Trends in Whites' Explanationsof the Black-White Gap in Socioeconomic Status,
1977-1989,55 AM. Soc. REV. 512 (1990) notes theparadox of whites favoring race equality
but not supporting programs to promote this. Using national survey data, Kluegel found
thatbetween the late 1970s and the late 1980s, "an individualistic perception of the causes
of the black-white socioeconomic gap remains prevalent," based on beliefs that blacks
are inherently inferior and/or do not have the motivation to succeed (68.2% in 1977;
64.6% in 1988-89). Id. at 523. A structural view of the gap included discrimination (19.9%
in 1977, 21.0% in 1988-89) and the lack of educational opportunity (6.7% in 1977, 9.0%
in 1988-89) and 5% found that none of these factors explained the gap. Id. at 517.
Respondents favoring individual explanations of the gap more strongly opposed
government assistance to blacks than whites holding structural views. Id. at 521. Kluegel
thus offers support for the thesis that conservative economic views help explain the
paradox of a belief in racial equality coexisting with lack of support for policies to ease
inequalities that allow whites to maintain a "comfortable acceptance" of the black-white
economic gap. Id. at 523-24.
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of issues. 181 The recent past has also seen an increase in black militancy and
protest demonstrations, often triggered by race motivated crimes that have
been widely publicized.1 82 Despite some improvements, 183 the long history of
race discrimination in American criminal justice has left a deep reservoir of
distrust, and significant differences in attitudes, between the races. 184
Because of the "new racism,"185 public opinion polls will not capture racist
statements by whites in any significant percentage. But in behavior, white
Americans continue to keep a clear social distance from blacks, and these
measures may be far more important indicators of juror attitudes. Housing
segregation, for example, continues to remain high in metropolitan areas. The
Chicago area's index of black-white residential segregation went from 91
percent to 88 percent from 1960 to 1980; for Los Angeles, the index moved from
89 percent to 79 percent over that twenty year period.186 Segregation patterns
are more severe for blacks than for other minority groups. The average
black-white housing segregation index in the United States is 80%; for Hispanic
and Asian-Americans "who entered many metropolitan areas in great numbers
in the 1970s ...segregation indices average about 45 points."18 7 When asked
in the 1980s if they would allow their children to attend schools with blacks,
95 percent of white respondents would allow it where a few of the students are
black, but only 37 percent would where most of the students are black.
Eighty-six percent of white respondents in 1978 said they would not move from
their residence if a black moved in next door; 46 percent said they would not
move if great numbers of blacks moved into their neighborhood.1 88 These
patterns reflect several concerns, including crime. Whites "hold three beliefs
about the effect of racial change on neighborhoods:" (1) that stable
neighborhoods are rare, i.e., that once African-Americans move into the
neighborhood, it quickly turns black, (2) residential property values are
lowered by the presence of blacks, and (3) "crime rates are higher in black
neighborhoods than in white neighborhoods."18 9
These are not local attitudes or minor issues in America today. These
pervasive fears of black crime by white Americans may indeed be overlooked
by jurists because of many external indices of real improvements in the
conditions of many African-Americans. This perspective overlooks the

181JAYNES & WILLIAMS, supra note 173, at 115-60.
182

1d. at 247.

1831d. at 473-89; WILBANKS, supra note 176.
184 JAYNES & WILLIAMS, supra note 173, at 215.

185 See supra note 180.
1861d. at 78.
187

1d. at 27.

188

1d. at 121-24.

89

1 1d. at 141.
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growing economic rift not only in America at large between classes, but
between middle class and disadvantaged blacks. Whatever the precise
economic reality, attitudes concerning race and crime are real and if they are
likely to emerge anywhere, they are likely to emerge in the trial of a serious
crime where race is a central concern. Lawyers, when asked for quick
comments on the case by newspaper reporters, were quick to state the truth of
the matter: that race is a wild card that can be skillfully played in a trial such
as that of Rodney King's assailants. 190 it was only the California Court of
Appeals, in Powell, that clung to the legal fiction that race need not be taken
into account.
When California courts changed venue-on the basis of political factors they
had to speculate about the meaning that the political factor would have on the
minds of the jurors. In Maine the court feared "that the campaign competition
might inadvertently intrude during the course of a proceeding in which they
are also trial adversaries. "19 1 In Smith the court was concerned that local jurors
would feel personally victimized by the official corruption on trial. 192 And in
Powell the court concluded:
While we recognize that the incident and some of its ramifications
have received widespread publicity elsewhere, the impact on residents
of Los Angeles is unquestionably much greater because of the
unabated and acrimonious total involvement of city officials and local
community leaders. There is no doubt that these political biases would
193
invade the jury box if the case were tried in Los Angeles County.
At some level the speculation contained in the last sentence must be true,
although it would take a very fine social psychological study to determine
whether the political wrangling in Los Angeles had a greater potential impact
on the minds of potential jurors than the scenes of the beating. In view of the
far-reaching publicity, the tremendous impact of television on the public, and
the salience of race in this case, it is necessary to speculate on the impact of the
case to jurors outside Los Angeles. It is as plausible to guess that potential
non-Los Angeles white jurors might approach the well-known case with a
mixture of sadness and revulsion. While jurors who could pass the voir dire
challenges would not be overtly biased, they would most probably harbor the
"normal prejudices" of the day. Unlike their parents, fewer would believe that
African-American are inherently inferior,194 and they would likely believe that
lawful segregation was a blot on America's past. A clear majority would believe
that every person could, if only they would, get ahead by their individual effort.
190

See infra note 226 and accompanying text.

191 Maine v. Superior Court, 438 P.2d 372 (Cal. 1968).
192 Smith v. Superior Court, 80 Cal. Rptr. 693 (Cal. Ct. App. 1969).
193

Powell v. Superior Court, 283 Cal. Rptr. 777, 787 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991).

194

See Kluegel, supra note 180, at 517 (in 1988-89 this belief held by 28.3% of whites
aged 51-61, but by 14.9% of whites aged 18-28).
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They would probably feel comfortable knowing that they do not live in
predominantly black neighborhoods, since they are likely to believe that such
neighborhoods are more prone to crime. If they moved to a small town or to a
suburb from a large city, they may have experienced such concerns directly,
although their reasons for moving may have been generated by several factors.
These jurors, with a "normal" set of beliefs and fears, typically would view
police as their protectors not only from crime in general, but of crime
perpetrated by the stereotypical criminal in the American mind - a young Black
male. Rodney King was 25 years old at the time.
All this speculation goes to the point that was immediately intuited by many
who thought about the case: that the arguments made so skillfully by the
defense in the trial would be an easier "sell" to an all-white jury than a mixed
jury.195 If this is correct, then the Powell court faced a dilemma. The jury would
subtly lean in one direction in Los Angeles because of the local political furor,
but lean in another direction outside Los Angeles, especially if the jury's racial
composition was radically different. In such a case what should a court do? The
Powell court chose to ignore the risks involved in moving the case to another
venue and vicinage and to fasten on the political factor as a rationale.
The decision in Powell, although giving the appearance of being carefully
crafted by reviewing several factors as the basis for its decision, was
fundamentally flawed by its adherence to a stereotyped approach to the change
of venue issue when circumstances called for a non-stereotypical response. The
court asked whether the defendants could have received a trial by an impartial
jury within Los Angeles when it should have asked whether the defendants
could have received a trial by an impartial jury anywhere in the state. By not
thinking what "impartial" meant in a situation like the Rodney King case and
accepting the well-worn legal rubric, the court of appeals simply replaced the
demographics, values, and prejudices of Los Angeles County by those of
another place, which turned out to be Ventura, just over the county line.
A counter-argument is that jurors' social beliefs are not "political" factors and
that only matters like the struggle between Mayor Bradley, Chief Gates, and
the Los Angeles City Council, or election battles between trial participants are
political factors. Thus, it may be possible, however facile, to argue that since
there were no political issues which concerned potential jurors outside Los
Angeles, that the political factors noted in Powell outweighed any other factor
outside the county. But, as George Fletcher noted, "[t]he defense of Bernhard
Goetz was strongly political in the sense that it rode a crest of popular
enthusiasm for the symbolic significance of turning the tables on the youths
who menace so many law-abiding citizens." 196 We live in an era when the
personal lives of political candidates have become "political" matters. Since
candidates were first "sold" on television, matters of clothing style and personal

195

See sources cited supra note 6.
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GEORGE FLETCHER, A CRIME OF SELF-DEFENSE: BERNHARD GoErz AND THE LAW ON

TRIAL 209 (1988).
Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1993

37

CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 41:215

appearance, down to Richard Nixon's "five o'clock shadow" in his televised
debates with John Kennedy in 1960, have become political matters. While
classical definitions of politics concern power, in the last generation it has
become accepted that "sociological" factors like public opinion and the
distribution of wealth by class shape power-holding, and thus are central to
the definition of politics. Abroad but valid definition is that "[s]omething is
called political if it is thought to relate in a particularly intensive way to the
interests of the community."'197 Making allowances for a normal range of
thought, we are confident that most observers would agree that to potential
jurors outside Los Angeles the Rodney King case, involving a notorious
instance of excessive police force, involved the politics of race.
A final matter in this regard was a very real concern that the trial might spark
violence within Los Angeles if the police officers were acquitted in the county.
Indeed, Powell stated "that this court has received a document which can be
construed only as a threat of community violence if the case is transferred to
another venue,"198 noting that the document had been publicized in Los
Angeles newspapers and television. The court cited Lozano v. State199 as
support for moving venue. Despite Powell's hyperbolic and near-hysterical
reaction 20 0 to what may at that time have been political posturing or excited
talk, the point made in Lozano is serious. A juror in Los Angeles may have been
so concerned about a riot following an acquittal that this factor would cause
the juror to lean toward conviction.
There are several ways to look at this point. The riots that followed the Simi
Valley acquittal can be seen as validating the court's fear. However, a city on
its guard, such as Miami, could have positioned its police forces to quell any
incipient insurrection. Chief Gates was roundly criticized for having been at a
speaking engagement on the evening of the day of the verdict and being out
of touch with headquarters. 2 01 In the immediate aftermath the vaunted Los
Angeles police were in disarray.202 A second point is that an acquittal in Los
197

Oro KIRCHHEIMER, POLITICAL JUSTICE 25 (1961).

198 Powell

v. Superior Court, 283 Cal. Rptr. 777, 787 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991).

199584 So. 2d 19 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991). For criticism of Lozano, see infra notes 284-85
and accompanying text.
200
If the mere possibility an order directing that trial be conducted outside
Los Angeles County gives rise to such threats, we must draw the inevitable inference about the possibility of threats which could surface during
the trial itself. Such unacceptable attempts to influence the judicial proceedings at this early stage add another impermissible factor into the
boiling cauldron surrounding this case, making it imperative to take every
step possible to ensure that an impartial unbiased jury be seated.
Powell, 283 Cal. Rptr. at 787.
201 Robert Reinhold, PoliceAre Slow to React as the Violence Spreads, N.Y. TIMES, May 1,
1992, at Al, col. 3.
202 Jane Fritsch, Police May Have Ignored Basic Riot Plan, N.Y. TIMES, May 7, 1992, at
A10, col. 1.
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Angeles by a panel that would likely have included black jurors, would not
have furnished to African-Americans in Los Angeles the same justified anger
as the acquittal by a suburban jury containing no African-Americans and
drawn from a vicinage where it would be most unlikely to draw such a juror.203
Another point is that the court in Powell, like governments that negotiate with
hostage taking terrorists, opened the judicial system to further threats of
violence. From this perspective the better position would have been for the
court to do what it believed was correct and to call on the government to supply
the necessary protection.
These points still do not erase the disturbing possibility of the threat of
violence affecting the mind of the Los Angeles juror in an action such as the
Rodney King case. Indeed, a Simi Valley juror later expressed remorse for not
considering the consequences that would follow the acquittal. 204 This juror's
oblivion to the possible fallout of an acquittal is apparently exactly what the
Court of Appeals thought desirable in Powell. If, as the Supreme Court of the
United States said in Iruin v. Dowd, "scarcely any of those best qualified to serve
as jurors will not have formed some impression or opinion as to the merits of
the case," 205 then there is a troubling assumption at the heart of Powell. The
court would seem to have preferred a totally blank jury on the false assumption
that such a jury was impartial. If the case fit the change of venue stereotype of
moving a case from a small town to a big city where nobody has heard of the
crime, then the change of venue would be adequate under the impartiality
paradigm. But, to bring together the three points of our analysis, where
publicity is rife, the nature of the publicity intrusive into the minds of potential
jurors everywhere, and the case inherently political, it is no longer possible to
stand by the change of venue stereotype. For a Simi Valley juror, or a juror
anywhere else in California, to have been oblivious to the potential violence
following the case was as much a political factor as for a Los Angeles juror to
have been sensitive to the issue. A critic of this view can argue that the Los
Angeles juror was thinking about something other than the evidence while the
outside juror was thinking only about the evidence. That was what the Simi
Valley juror told the world. But in a "Rodney King case" we do not know what
the juror really knows and surmises. It is as likely that a non-Los Angeles juror
would think that once an acquittal was announced all hell would break loose
in Los Angeles, and that the juror could accept this consequence with equa-

203

See infra notes 276-81 and accompanying text.
2041 don't live where the rioting was, but I know what it's like in those

neighborhoods .... My first reaction was, 'Oh my God, I've been part of something that

is completely out of control.' You have to feel some sense of responsibility for it." Jana
MazanecJuror:'Sense ofresponsibility'forriots, USA TODAY, May 5,1992, at 1A (emphasis
added).
20 5Irvin

v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 722 (1960).
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nimity, knowing that he would be protected by distance, and by police forces,
20 6
from "those people." There are times when ignorance is no excuse.
III. AN INTEREST ANALYSIS OF VENUE

07

As shown above, the decision in Powellwas inadequate. While the court gave
microscopic scrutiny to the publicity and political impact of the case within Los
Angeles, it gave no consideration to the impact of the intense media barrage
on people outside Los Angeles. 208 One reason for this is that defense counsel,
for good tactical reasons, focused their attention only on events within Los
Angeles, thus channelling and narrowing the attention of the trial and appellate
courts.
Other reasons have to do with assumptions that judges bring to change of
venue cases. Typical change of venue criminal cases involve local publicity and
prejudice without substantial coverage in other parts of a state. But when this
stereotype does not apply, a different perspective is required. 209 The

206

WALTER LAQUEU,, THE TERRIBLE SECRET: SUPPRESSION OF THE TRUTH ABOUT
HITLER'S "FINAL SOLUTION" (1982).
2 07

We have not found anything that can be understood as an interest analysis in the
few studies of venue and vicinage studies in criminal law, outside of considerations of
the search for an impartial jury. An interesting "interest analysis" in administrative law
is Cass Sunstein, Participation,PublicLaw, and Venue Reform, 49 U. CHI. L. REV. 976 (1982),
which discusses the relationship between the location of the forum, substantive
outcomes, and the changing role of courts: "[A]judication is no longer conceived of as
merely dispute-settlement, but has assumed a place alongside voting as a means of
influencing government policy." Id. at 987. While this statement, reflecting the use of
courts by interest groups, is too strong to apply "neat" to the criminal law, it points to
the fact that jury service is an element of enfranchisement and empowerment and the
criminal verdicts havepoliical effects. See, e.g., the "Mormon cases:" Reynolds v. United
States, 98 U.S. 145 (1879) (upholding juror challenge on grounds of polygamy); Miles v.
United States, 103 U.S. 304 (1880) (prospective juror may be asked about beliefs
regarding polygamy); Murphy v. Ramsey, 114 U.S. 15 (1884) (upholding
disenfranchisement of polygamist). See Orma Linford, The Mormons and the Law:
Polygamy Cases, and the Territoryof Utah, 9 UTAH L. REV. 308, 543 (1964-65).
208
The intense worldwide reaction to the post-verdict riots is understandable in light
of the fact that the videotape of Rodney King's beating was repeatedly played on
television throughout the United States and the rest of the world. Craig Whitney, World
View- Europe is Aghast, FearingUnrest There; JapanTakes High Moral Ground, N.Y. TIMES,
May 3, 1992, at 18. As the NEW YORK TIMES remarked editorially upon the federal
indictment of the four officers for violating Rodney King's civil rights, "A Federal
courtroom is an appropriate forum to try this case; it scarred the nation as well." N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 7,1992, at A14.
209

See supra note 47 and accompanying text. It may be that the stereotypical response
is reinforced by a lingering, even romantic, image of courts as autonomous and central
institutions in rural settings. Even judges in multi-judge metropolitan courts may in
their mind's eye dwell on imagery of courts operating in self-sufficient and partially
isolated communities where news of local events does not travel instantaneously to the
larger world. Whether this is or is not the case, a change of venue case like Powell displays
a number of assumptions that may not fit the circumstances.
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assumption that the community is a self-contained unit, sealed off from other
isolated communities typically does not confront difficulties in rigorously
defining "community."210 The question of what constitutes a community in
venue cases is exacerbated by different ethnic compositions of areas and by
vicinage rules designed for juror convenience, as is the case in California. Los
Angeles, for example, is divided into eleven judicial districts with a courthouse
in each and juries are drawn by computer to give preference to not having to
travel more than 20 miles to a courthouse. Los Angeles jurors, then, typically
represent not the county as a whole but the "community" in a 20 mile radius
from the courthouse. 211 Does the "Los Angeles community" mean a
neighborhood such as South-Central Los Angeles within city limits, the City,
the County, or the Los Angeles Standard Metropolitan area, including near
suburbs like Simi Valley? The definition can clearly differ for different
purposes.
Because attorneys challenging the county of original venue have polls
conducted only in that place, the cases tend to assume there has been little or
no publicity about the case in the removal venue. Even where this was patently
not the case in Powell, the court virtually ignored the external effects of the
publicity. But in light of the changing nature of the news media, this easy
assumption is no longer possible.2 12 In the aftermath of the "Rodney King case"
courts will have to become sensitive to the pervasive and intrusive impact of
the news media, especially as its formats come more and more to resemble
television entertainment programs.
Another assumption, critical to our interest analysis, is that a "perfectly
impartial" jury can be found. We argue, to the contrary, that in a significant
sense, there is no such a thing as a perfectly impartial jury, but only what we
label a jury of "practical impartiality." We do not mean to suggest that most
juries are grossly biased. Nor do we think that voir dire and judges' instructions
have no effect on focusing the attention of jurors on the evidence and requiring
of them a sober approach to their task.213 In this sense we believe that the law
does achieve a level of practical impartiality that is ordinarily adequate for the
practical necessity of trying cases. Nevertheless, juries inevitably reflect the

21OCommunity, in the context of a jury venue and vicinage, can refer to a county, a
multi-county judicial district, a judicial district within a county or city. Depending on
context, this expansive and elusive term can refer to a national or global "community."
See Kershen, supra note 9, at 823.
Legal anthropologists and historians have noted the ambiguities, contradictions,
mythic elements, and difficulties in the concept of community in relation to American
law. See SALLY E. MERRY, GETTING JUSTICE AND GErrING EvEN 173-74 (1990); JEROLD S.
AUERBACH, JUSTICE WITHOUT LAW? (1983). On the difficulty of defining community or

neighborhood see Harry Mika, MediatingNeighborhood Conflict: Conceptual and Strategic
Considerations,3 NEGOTIATIONJ. 397 (1987).
211
LISA ALEXANDER, supra note 8, at 281.
212

See supranotes 145-61 and accompanying text.

213

But see infra note 282.
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beliefs, values, common knowledge, and prejudices of their communities. In
this sense, a level of perfect impartiality cannot be achieved. Ordinarily, the
imperfections of the practical impartiality obtained by the voir dire can be
safely overlooked. But recent events and developments are making it necessary

for the legal world to pay closer attention to the risks of overlooking the
implications of the impossibility of perfect impartiality. Accepting this
understanding requires that when judges balance the costs and benefits of
transferring venue, that they take a comparative approach of the county of
venue and other places into account.
With this backdrop we consider a variety of interests that are potentially at
stake in venue change cases. Not each of the following interests has the same
standing in law or, indeed, in our eyes. Nevertheless, they exist in the minds
of some litigants and lawyers. The first interest is the ideal of impartiality.

A. Impartiality
A change of venue interest analysis is possible only from a skeptical
perspective about the existence of a perfectly impartial jury. This skepticism is
borne of the findings of the social sciences, especially of social psychology, that
perfect impartiality is not humanly possible. 214 Past influences and life
experiences necessarily shape the way in which all persons understand and
react to the world around them. Even if a person is free of gross forms of bigotry
abhorred and declining in contemporary America, such as stereotypical racial
or ethnic prejudice, she will hold some opinions that are in part formed by
group associations. 215 The substantial growth of the practice of jury research

214

[S]ince few persons have led such sheltered lives that they have not
formed opinions about the law, or other people, or the issues involved
in a case, the assumption of a 'tabula rasa' in selected jurors would be
naive. In both actual and simulated juries, a variety of biases have been
shown to affect juror verdicts.
Martin F. Kaplan & Lynn E. Miller, Reducing the Effects of Juror Bias in THE JURY Box:
CONTROVERSIES IN TIE COURTROOM 115 (Lawrence S. Wrightsman, et al. eds. 1987)
(references omitted).
The deeper roots of this skepticism lies in a fundamental reorientation of scientific
thinking resulting from Karl Popper's critique of induction as the basis of the ability of
the scientific enterprise to prove the truth or falsity of statements. According to Popper,
theoretical insight precedes inductive testing. In the place of a science of absolute
certainty, Popper's now widely accepted view is that all scientific theory is tentative,
subject to refutation or revision on the basis of new evidence or advanced theoretical
speculation that replace or revise older theories. See KARL POPPER, THE LOGIC OF
SCIENTIFIC DISCOVERY; THoMAs KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS, (2d

ed., Enlarged, 1970).
21 5 According to Judith Shklar, a person's political preferences, simple and
comprehensive, formed as the result of group identity and group associations, is
denoted as one's ideology. The use of this term, which is neutral to social scientists but
loaded with political overtones to non-scientists, resulted in unwarranted criticism of
Prof. Shklar's thesis about what she calls "legalism," the ideology of lawyers that holds
moral conduct to be a matter of rule following. See JUDITH SHKLAR, LEGALISM vii-xiv, 1,
4-5 (1986). Shklar's comments are a fair warning about the obtuseness of portions of the

https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol41/iss2/4

42

19931

RETHINKING VENUE

and trial consulting is evidence that litigators and judges accept the basic social
psychological understanding that a person's views, to some degree, are
associated with her group identity.216
The evidence of jury research, 217 paradoxically, supports the position that in
close cases juror characteristics must be taken into account because they will
have some impact on the verdict (i.e., "perfect impartiality" does not exist)
while reaffirming the position that the "practical impartiality" of a properly
selected jury is allowable in most (but not all) cases. Jury research has been used
since 1972 to assist litigators in selecting juries with predispositions favorable
to their sides. Jury research uses a variety of social scientific methods to replace
trial attorneys' proverbial hunches as the basis for exercising peremptory
challenges on the grounds that systematic information and analysis are more
likely to produce the desired result. Techniques include: pre-trial surveys of
random jury-eligible samples of citizens in a jurisdiction, surveys of
previously-serving jurors in the same court, asking prospective jurors to
provide information about relevant attributes such as authoritarianism, trial
story surveys, demographic surveys of prospective jurors, pre-trial focus
groups, in-court expert rating of prospective jurors' non-verbal
communications, shadow juries, and trial simulations. 218 Summaries of
research findings aboutjury research confirm our presuppositions about juries:
Several reviews of this research indicate that individual differences
can affect juror decision-making. However, this research has failed to
produce consistent relationships between demographics and
verdict/punishment measures across studies. In addition, significant
relationships between various attitudes held by individuals and
verdict/punishment measures have not yielded entirely consistent
results. The inability to isolate consistent demographic predictors
legal community to valid ideas which threaten their interests, especially any suggestion
that pure objectivity is not possible in the realm of the law, for the "values of impartial
judgment, according to rules, are the courts' overt reason for existence." Id.at viii.
216

See Dr. Jeffrey R. Boyll, Behavioral Trial Consulting: What Do Practicing Attorneys
Think?, 13 TRIAL DIPLOMACYJ. 97,101 (1990) (21 out of 100 litigators surveyed in greater
Phoenix, Arizona had used behavioral trial consultants). Membership in the American
Society of Trial Consultants rose from 19 to 230 in ten years. In Miami, William Kennedy
Smith paid $200,000 for consulting aid to help pick the jury that eventually acquitted
him of rape. Ted Gest, The Justice System: Getting a Fair Trial, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT,
May 25, 1992, at 36.
2 17

See sources cited infra note 218.

2 18

See John Charles S. Pierce, Selecting the Perfect Jury: Use of Consultants in Voir Dire,
14 LAW & PSYCH. REV. 167 (1990); John A. Call, Jury Research: Improving Trial Results, 18
TRIAL LAW. QUARTERLY 33 (Summer/Fall 1987); Jeffrey T. Frederick, Social Science
Involvement in Voir Dire: Preliminary Data on the Effectiveness of "Scientific Jury Selection",
2 BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES & THE L. 375 (1984). Shadow juries are hired mock jurors who
sit in the courtroom and assess the attorney's performance and the jury's reaction. In a
trial simulation the attorney presents a practice case to a mock jury before trial to get
feedback on attomey effectiveness.
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across studies is not surprising in view of the different populations
studied and variations in the type of cases considered. The
inconsistencies observed in relationships between attitudes and
verdict/punishment preferences, however, may reflect the more
general problem of attitude-behavior discrepancies.
Of particular relevance here are the results of those few studies
examining systematic jury selection .... The results indicated that both
demographic and case specific attitudes were related to verdict
preferences. However, neither demographic characteristics or case
specific attitudes accounted for greater than eight or nine percent of
the variance in verdict preferences. The best predictor of verdict
preference was how the jurors rated the strength of the parties
in turn was influenced by the individual's case
evidence, which 219
specific attitudes.
Thus, juries decide cases primarily on the basis of the evidence, but personal
attributes and attitudes play a measurable role. These findings support the
conclusion that in most cases the jury's demographics can be overlooked for
change of venue purposes. The finding that case evidence has the greatest
influence on decisions supports the belief in juries' practical impartiality,
despite the inevitable link between one's group associations and her opinions,
beliefs, and values. In a rough and workable sense, then, a viable notion of the
impartial jury required by law exists. The ancient practice of using several
fact-deciders rather than a single judge is a powerful device to eliminate the
subtle (or not so subtle) biases of a single individual from the decision.220 The
deliberation requirement is vital to reducing reliance on overt individual
prejudices. Other valued jury practices, including voir dire, the judge's
instructions on the law and evidence, and the atmosphere of civic duty and
solemnity that attend the trial, all work to reduce overt prejudice. But the need
for these devices reminds us that jury selection, composition, and rules, like the
antisepsis of the operating room, is a process where much care is expended to
create an artificial environment of "hyper-faimess" to counteract the normal
venting of attitudes that could infect the trial with unaccepted influences.
Attitudes, values, mores, opinions, and prejudices cannot be totally eradicated
from the minds of jurors, and may in their submerged form continue to be a
factor in a trial. 22 1

219Frederick, supra note 218,
at 379-80 (references omitted). The case specific attitudes
referred to by Frederick include not only attitudes regarding the specific criminal
charges, but also include background personality measures such as authoritarianism.
Accord, KAPLAN & MILLER, supra note 214.
220

REID HASTIE, ETAL., INSIDE THE JURY 7-11 (1983); LAWRENCE S. WRIGHTSMAN, ETAL.,

INTHE JURY Box 191-234, 256-58 (1987).
22

1For a particularly

illuminating example, see FLETCHER, supranote 196; see infra note

282.
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The practical understanding of an impartial jury, then, must accept some
introduction of community norms into the decision-making process, as is at
times acknowledged by courts. 222 But it is also acknowledged that in some

circumstances community norms imply unacceptable prejudice. Hence the
peremptory challenge cases.2 23 While no scientific test exists to differentiate a
jury espousing community norms from one enacting local prejudices, judges
must ever be alert to the distinction, at least in cases where gross and
unacceptable prejudices make it unlikely that a jury of "practical impartiality"
can be empaneled.
The judges in Powell, discounted the effect of widespread publicity on
Manson grounds. 224 But we have found their reliance on the political impact of
the case in Los Angeles unconvincing, when offset by the political impact on
potential jurors elsewhere. What the court failed to consider was that a case
with such widespread and intense publicity was likely to have as much of an
impact on juries in other California counties.
Thus, in a race-sensitive case the court must give some thought to the weight
that race may play with the jury. The overtly expressed race bigotry that was
noted as late as the 1950s is not likely to be heard injury deliberations today.22 5
Still, if African- and European-Americans display significant differences in
attitudes on racially tinged issues to the point that race consciousness can
reasonably be expected to affect all potential jurors, how should courts handle
such matters?
The best exploration of the meaning of America's complex and ambiguous
stance on race in criminal trials is George Fletcher's study of the Bernhard
Goetz trial. 226 Goetz's attorneys skillfully played on fears of crime,

intermingled with fears of black urban youths, in many ways. Yet, they never
overtly mentioned the racial factor. They understood that the average person
was not likely to consider himself a bigot, but was likely to harbor concerns
with stereotypes of criminals. From the defense perspective, even a typically
law abiding African-American juror, in a large city, was also prone to
stereotypes of young black men as criminals. Given this ambiguity, the defense
would have ruined its own case by making the latent understandings of race
and crime explicit. In this regard, the Rodney King case was a mirror image of
the Goetz case. The defense attorneys had to play on racial fears but had to do
so subtly, by appealing to jurors' ability to see the white police-officer
defendants as a line of protection against black crime and anarchy. Their task
222 See, e.g.,

People v. Harris, 623 P.2d 240, 262-63 (Cal. 1981) (Bird, C.J., dissenting),

cert. denied sub norn. Harris v. California, 454 U.S. 882 (1981).
223

See supra note 35.

2 24

See supra notes 41, 43, 164 and accompanying text.

225See VALERIE HANS & NEIL VIDMAR, JUDGING THE JURY 137

(1986).

22 6

See FLETCHER, supra note 196. Goetz was the notorious "subway vigilante" shooter
of four black youths in a New York City subway car in 1984. He was acquitted of the
most serious charges.
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was immeasurably assisted by presenting their case to a jury with no
African-Americans in a venue where few minorities lived.
In conclusion, any court failing to give serious consideration to the inevitable
impact of race on jury deliberations, in a case of alleged white on black police
brutality, has failed to adequately exercise its discretion in a responsible
manner. It is disturbing that the Powell decision gave virtually no extended
discussion to the issue of race when it was clearly the most salient issue in the
venue change decision. No amount of sugar coating, avoidance, or mantra-like
invocation of the "if-you-move-it, the-jury-will-be-impartial" formula, can
remove the fact that racial composition will be an important factor in jury
selection and deliberations. Also, it will be important whether the jury is
selected from a racially mixed city, such as Los Angeles, or from a more
homogenous area, such as Simi Valley. The court of appeals tried to avoid the
implications of its decision, but the hard fact is that in this case the jury would
be inevitably slanted one way or the other. By acceding to the defendant's
motion, the court, instead of choosing an impartial jury, favored one jury's
biases over another's. Powell'simplicit belief in the perfect impartiality of a jury
in a removed venue was therefore an inadequate basis for decision.
Still, raising the impartiality issue does not answer it. The question now
becomes, is there a principled basis for deciding a change of venue issue in a
case like Powell, where race is inevitably implicated in the facts of the case,
where race-consciousness about the case has been raised, and where publicity
is as widespread throughout the state for all practical purposes as in the county
of original venue?
B. Legal Liberalism and Conservatism
The awareness that perfect jury impartiality is impossible2 27 opens the way
to consider other interests. One set of interests is legal liberalism and
conservatism or, in Herbert Packer's familiar dichotomy, the due process and
crime control models of criminal justice.228 Liberalism, a standard intellectual
mainstay of criminal procedure law, views the Bill of Rights as a constitutional
barrier against the constant threat of government overreaching and misuse of
power by taking certain processes and values out of the reach of majoritarian
politics. While rights such as free speech are the necessary matrix for the
enjoyment of majoritarian politics, the criminal justice provisions of the Fourth,
Fifth, Sixth and Eighth Amendments prevent governments from sliding into

2 27This

conclusion was pointedly made by critics of the change of venue in Powell.

See Adrianne Goodman, NAACP Official Criticizes Venue Change in King Case, Los
ANGELES TIMES,
2 28

Dec. 5, 1991, at B3, col. 5.

HERBERT L. PACKER, THE LIMITs OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 149-246 (1968).

Walter

B. Miller, Ideology and Criminal Justice Policy: Son Current Issues, 64 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 141 (1973), delineates a ten point spectrum of liberal and conservative
opinion rather than a dichotomy.
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destructive tyranny through the power to criminalize political opponents. 229
From this perspective, constitutional process requirements should be
interpreted to favor the individual criminal defendant against the government.
The implication in venue cases is to prevent the state from imposing
burdensome venues by statute and to favor defense requests for changes of
venue. Doubts should be resolved in favor of the defendant. 230
The counter-argument to legal liberalism, legal conservatism or the crime
control model, posits that without effective government the resulting anarchy
and widespread criminality effectively curbs freedom in a direct way, leading
to a social life that is impoverished and miserable along with a constricted
political life. Packer carefully set the crime control model within the larger
framework of constitutional government, fundamental fairness, and an
independent judiciary. This model nevertheless stresses speed and finality.231
From this perspective the criminal process may be misused by defendants to
undermine if not destroy the overriding end of the law to do justice and
ascertain guilt and innocence. The hurdles erected by the due process paradigm
can, if pushed to their limits, undermine the ability of the government to
prosecute those deserving of punishment. At the most extreme, an exaggerated
view or excessive application of rights causes the machinery of justice to break
down. This in turn undermines the ability of government to protect citizens,
spurring vigilantism and lawlessness that leads to tyranny as citizens grow
impatient with lawfully constituted government. From this perspective,
change of venue petitions can be viewed skeptically as delay tactics by
defendants that if granted, except in the most egregious cases of jury bias or
community intolerance, adds unnecessary burdens to already overworked
courts.

A more balanced view evaluates change of venue motions evenhandedly.
The body of criminal venue case law indeed balances the classic and
inescapable liberal-conservative tension in a practical and nonideological
manner. In cases where the prosecution chooses a venue unrelated to the place
of the crime and puts defendants to inconvenience, especially in politically
sensitive cases, the liberal aspect of the Sixth Amendment should invalidate
such venue.232 Nevertheless, the liberal approach does not require a change of
venue at every defendant's demand. 233 In most ordinary criminal cases the
craft-oriented approach taken by intermediate appellate courts appears to deny

229

See, e.g., HALL, supra note 64, 29-77; KIRCHHEIMER, supra note 197.

2 30

Martinez v. Superior Court, 629 P.2d 502,503-04 (Cal. 1981); Fain v. Superior Court,
465 P.2d 23, 25 (Cal. 1970); Young v. Superior Court, 178 Cal. Rptr. 394 (Cal. Ct. App.
1991); see supra note 12 and accompanying text.
23 1

PACKER supra note 228, at 154-59.

23 2

See supra note 12 and accompanying text.

233

"[W]e have clearly rejected the establishment of a presumption in favor of a venue
change in all capital cases." People v. Hamilton, 774 P.2d 730, 739 (Cal. 1989).
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most requests for change of venue where actual prejudice is not shown. 234
Courts, of course, do grant venue changes where to do so measurably increase
fairness by eliminating or decreasing the prejudicial effects of pre-trial
publicity. This paradigm works well in ordinary cases but breaks down in
notorious ones. Thus, the due process and crime control approaches cancel
each other out as useful guideposts for making difficult decisions in change of
venue cases. The vicinage requirement is not absolute and should give way to
fairness issues but fairness has to be evaluated on a case by case basis. In a case
like Powell the pro-defense bias of the Sixth Amendment does not necessarily
carry the day.2 35 In this case an awareness of the real media impact and the way
in which race and political considerations were as likely to affect California
jurors outside Los Angeles as well as residents of the county, should have been
seen to cancel out any constitutional favor to defendants.
C. Race Consciousness
Another interest that may arise in venue change cases is race-consciousness.
Our premise is that in a race-sensitive case even jurors drawn from a fair
cross-section of the community and subjected to voir dire (i.e., a "practically
23 6
impartial" jury) cannot entirely avoid the subtle influence of the race factor.
It is a baleful fact of American history that a large portion of the white
population has been held in thrall to "Negrophobia " 237 from the beginning.
This has influenced criminal justice in many ways. The link between the Warren
Court's civil rights and criminal procedure agendas was not fortuitous, since
many of the Court's liberal criminal procedure cases counteracted oppressive
tactics designed to politically repress African-Americans. 238 Even the currently
conservative Court acts with special sensitivity to issues of criminal procedure
239
that directly implicate race, as in the jury selection and voir dire cases.
Nevertheless, the politics of race is still a sensitive issue in an era characterized
240
by more subtle forms of discrimination.
The interest of race-consciousness can apply to change of venue decision in
different ways. One position is that where the defendant or the victim is a

234

See supra note 13.

23 5

See generally ALFREDO GARCIA, THE SIXTH AMENDMENT IN MODERN AMERICAN
JURISPRUDENCE: A CRITICAL PERSPECTIVE. (1992).
23 6
See supra notes 35, 173-84 and accompanying text; see also, Thomas Pettigrew, New
Patternsof Racism: The Different World of 1984 and 1964, 37 RUTGERS L. REV. 673 (1985).
23 7
GARY WILLS, LINCOLN AT GETTYSBURG: THE WORDS THAT REMADE AMERICA 91
(1992).
23 8

See ARTHUR J. GOLDBERG, EQUAL JUSTICE: THE WARREN ERA OF THE SUPREME COURT
(1971); FRED P. GRAHAM, THE DUE PROCESS REVOLUTION: THE WARREN COURT'S IMPACT

ON CRIMINALLAW (1970).
23 9

See supra note 35.

2 40

See supra notes 170-89 and accompanying text.
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member of a discernable and subjugated minority group, and a showing is
substantiated that the defendant's or victim's race is reasonably likely to affect
the jury the venue decision should be most favorable to the minority person,
whether the victim or defendant. Applying this approach, the minority party
would not be able to dictate the venue, but could overtly advance race as an
element to be weighed in the discretionary decision. In most cases, this factor
would not change the decision. In an ordinary criminal case, where pre-trial
publicity is localized, and defendants are minority group members in an
all-white county, the court would likely order a change of venue on grounds
of impartiality.24 1 On the other hand, in Powell such a factor would have
required the court to consider the likely impacts of race on juries in Los Angeles
and in any other part of the state. The court would have been constrained to
leave venue in Los Angeles because the defendants were white police officers
and the victim an African-American.
In defense of this position, to avoid the race issue only submerges a matter
that is inevitably present, leaving courts open to charges of hypocrisy. This
approach is also based on an understanding that in the past judicial power had
been misused to support racism; despite the formal eradication of racism in
courtrooms, a pervasive mistrust of the justice process lingers among many
minority citizens. On a more psychologically subtle level, white judges and
lawyers cannot operate with complete racial impartiality, and juries cannot be
fully trusted to deal with racial conflict in a truly neutral manner. Sensitivity
to these legitimate concerns should at least require courts to indicate an
awareness of the issues.
A race-determined approach is raised for consideration because there are
likely to be some who believe it is a proper consideration and because it is
impossible to entirely eradicate considerations of race in cases such as Powell.
Indeed, a strain of legal scholarship has recently suggested that in sensitive
policy areas of public and private law, race-consciousness rather than race
neutrality should be advanced as a positive value and consideration. In
suggestive and wide ranging essays Donald Lively,242 Gary Peller,24 3 and
Alexander Aleinikoff 244 have argued that the dominant colorblind stance of
the law, while partially set aside in affirmative action cases, is undermining
hard won gains of previously disadvantaged minorities. Peller sees the current
potency of colorblindness as a reaction to the Black nationalist challenge to the
universalist assumptions of integration in the 1960s. While not supporting
extreme separatism, Peller points out that universalism weakens the cultural

24

lSee, e.g., People v. Coleman, 768 P.2d 32 (Cal. 1989), cert. denied sub nom. Coleman
v. California 494 U.S. 1038 (1990); Martinez v. Superior Court, 629 P.2d 502; Williams v.
Superior Court, 668 P.2d 799 (Cal. 1983).
242

Donald E. Lively, Color-Blindnessand Social Blindness: Echoesfrom an Infamous Past,

33 How. L. J. 267 (1990).
243

Gary Peller, Race Consciousness, 1990 DUKE L. J. 758.

2 44

T. Alexander Aleinikoff, A Casefor Race-Consciousness,91 COL. L. REV. 1060 (1991).
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identity not only of African-Americans but other Americans as well. Aleinikoff,
who admits that race-consciousness is a difficult legal and constitutional
argument to make, 245 bases his position on the continuing crisis of inequality
in all social and economic spheres of life, on the pervasive embeddedness of
racial thought and action to the general detriment of blacks in American society,
and on the strategic conclusion that for all the gains made in the past against
discrimination by colorblindness, "it has now become an impediment in the
struggle to end racial inequality."246 Aleinikoff asserts that a race-conscious
policy has application in many areas of law; however, none involved criminal
law, except for equality of representation on juries.247 But even in criminal law
scholarship, indirect 248 and overt 24 9 arguments have been made in favor of
affirmative action in sentencing. Finally, in the aftermath of the Simi Valley
acquittals, several state legislatures are reported to have proposed laws
cases that must be moved at least go to sites
guaranteeing "that racially tinged'250
with similar ethnic populations.
Despite the serious arguments for race-conscious policies in the law, this
approach is clearly problematic here. To skew the venue decision in favor of
one race or ethnic group as a matter of law obviously flies in the face of
fundamental equal protection norms.2 51 In cases involving members of
24 5"My attack

on colorblindness is stated more in cognitive and cultural terms; and

my defense of color-consciousness is made more in terms of political principle than
constitutional argument." Id. at 1062.
246

1d.

247
He suggested: applications for radio and television licenses, local government
policies of hiring minorities for social service positions where clients are predominantly
minority group members, voting rules, school integration, police force integration,
modifying curricula to include the works of minorities, giving a weight to race in hiring
for higher education positions. Id. at 1065.
248
Charles J.Ogletree, Commentary: The Death of Discretion?Reflections on the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1938, 1958 (1988) (poverty, educational
deprivation, family instability, prior unemployment, drug dependence and the like
should be mitigating factors in sentencing; since these conditions fall disproportionately
on minority group members, "treating such circumstances as mitigating factors, far from
increasing racial disparities in sentencing, should tend to diminish them.)
249 Bruce P. Archibald, Sentencing and VisibleMinorities: Equalityand Affirmative Action
in the Criminal Justice System, 12 DALHOUSIE L. J. 377 (1989). This explicit call for
affirmative action in sentencing in favor of "visible minorities" (blacks and aborigines
are mentioned) is weakened by a lack of clarity as to whether such a program would
apply across-the-board or only to minor crimes for which community sentencing is
appropriate. Archibald points out that such a proposal is less problematic under
Canada's Constitutional Charter § 15(2) than under the Fourteenth Amendment Equal
Protection Clause of the U.S. Constitution.
250

See Gest, supra note 216.

25

1"The moral imperative of racial neutrality is the driving force of the Equal
Protection Clause." City of Richmond v. J. A. Croson, 488 U.S. 469, 518, 734 (1989)
(Kennedy, J. concurring), quoted in Aleinikoff, supra note 244, at 1077. "A normative
principle of 'colorblindness' runs deep in the American civil rights narratives ....To
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different minority groups, this approach gives no guidance and is likely to
breed confusion and hostility. A race-conscious policy assumes that racism
among individuals runs in only one direction, a view of reality that is
questionable. Even if the politically charged assumption that only whites can
be considered racist in an unequal society is believed, it is not conducive to
selecting impartial jurors in voir dire, since the choice of a jury involves
assessing the ways in which an array of ordinary citizens of all races think. It
could, in some instances, offer to criminals who are minority group members
a form of partial immunity from the normal process of law by suggesting that
they select areas of non-minority residence for criminal activity in the hope of
receiving a more favorable venue at trial.
A race-determined policy would tend to have negative effects on the courts
and on popular concepts of justice. It would generally infect the voir dire and
tend to destroy that level of practical impartiality that the law can achieve even
if perfect impartiality is never attainable in human affairs. Such a position flies
in the face of the Supreme Court's efforts to exclude the practical operation of
race-determined decisions in lawyers' exercises of peremptory challenges.2 52
Such an approach would be met with hostility from the broad majority of
citizens who believe in the formal importance of race neutrality in these kinds
of decisions.2 53 Whatever position is held on the complex issues of affirmative
action, in the realm of crime and retributive justice, it violates deeply held
beliefs of strict individual responsibility and tends to upset efforts to exclude
race from procedural or substantive decisions of criminal courts.
Thus, on the one hand, Powell's adherence to the legal fiction that removing
the case from Los Angeles would produce an impartial jury is unsettling. The
opinion hypocritically avoided any serious discussion of the central issue of
race. The court attempted to exorcise race from the case by basing its decision
on its cursory review of the standard "objective" factors and its conclusory
treatment of the political factor. This was tragically wrong-headed. Its fiction
of strict neutrality collapsed in obvious falsehood and bitter recriminations the
moment the verdicts were pronounced.
On the other hand, to advocate a race-conscious standard as the test for
change of venue may not be the answer. Perhaps it is possible for a court to
attempt to be open about race in a race-sensitive case by noting the prominence
of the factor and attempting to control jury biases by cautionary instructions.
The danger is that the court may only heighten awareness of the gap between
practical and perfect impartiality without offering a positive rationale for
settling the venue question or effectively controlling subtle juror biases. It is
not meant to underestimate the ability of courts, or other political actors, to

the extent colorblindness represents the goal of anti-discrimination law,
race-consciousness measures must always be defended as temporary and transitional."
Aleinikoff, supra note 244, at 1061.
252

See supra note 35.

253

See JAYNES & WILLIAMS, supra note 173.
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adhere to fictions or insupportable formulations, when they believe that vital
interests are at stake. It surely would be a difficult thing for a court to
acknowledge the influence of racial factors, even if, this factor is prominent in
the minds of all the trial actors and observers.
Thus, where race is a factor courts are caught in a dilemma of maintaining
hypocritical silence on the one hand or opening a pandora's box on the other.
Revived interest in localism may be the most appropriate, race-neutral and
non-hypocritical way to resolve the change of venue issue in difficult cases,
such as Powell. This final interest is discussed in the conclusion.
IV. CONCLUSION: THE INTEREST OF LOCALISM

Impartiality, the due process approach, and race-consciousness have been
reviewed as possible guides to determining venue questions in difficult cases
where publicity blankets an entire state or region and highly volatile issues rise
to the fore. For differing reasons all have been rejected, although we maintained
that in typical cases "practical impartiality" is the appropriate standard. In
fastening on localism as the proper measure for the determination of the venue
issue in Powell, it is necessary to go back to the nation's founding and review
the scholarship that informs our understanding of the jury. Courts and
legislatures are urged to think hard and well about what the jury means in states
where the fates of criminal defendants are in the hands of ordinary citizens
chosen by lot.
A. Localism and the CriminalJury
jury
The political and legal elements of the Sixth Amendment's 254
provision-vicinage and impartiality-sit together in potential tension. To
Heller the vicinage requirement was anachronistic long before 1789 because
jurors no longer were witnesses. 255 The political issues accompanying the
separation from England led to the view, especially among anti-Federalists,
that vicinage and venue were among those rights necessary to protect
individual liberty against government tyranny. Ironically, Heller's vision was
shaped by a very conservative Supreme Court willing in 1950 "to depart from
the former rigid interpretation of the procedural guarantees .... "256 Since his
writing the Court has swung to a liberal and back to a conservative stance in
criminal procedure. It is worth considering that to extreme legalists the jury
system is an inconvenience and an impediment to an efficient, technically
proficient, and professionally dominated legal system. But the Sixth
Amendment requires that the tensions inherent in it be resolved, not
eradicated. The task facing the courts is to give meaning to vicinage and venue
2 54

"Vicinage, revitalized, as was suggested above, as [sic] a political argument of the
Revolution, as a legal concept appears to be at cross purposes with the ideal of
impartiality." Heller, supra note 9, at 95.
2 55
Id.
2 56

1d.
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requirements that are workable while giving due respect to underlying values.
For too long the value of localism was swept away as an anachronism. The
courts sought only to find the most "impartial" venue. But where the search for
impartiality becomes blind adherence to a legal fiction that produces more
mischief than gain, a revived interest in the value of localism provides a
satisfactory solution. This is not to propose an exaggerated "anti-Federalist"
position of extreme localism, such as eliminating the court's change of venue
discretion. Indeed, the Sixth Amendment itself does not take so extreme a
57
step.2
Powell fastened on the "political factor" as the rationale to change venue, in
the belief that to do so would eliminate "politics" from the case. But Powell's
exclusive focus on Los Angeles blinded it to the reality that by taking the case
away from a Los Angeles jury it necessarily subjected the case to the politics
of whatever jurisdiction inherited it. The preferable approach would have been
to acknowledge that the intense publicity and the extent to which it raised
issues of race, crime, and police brutality, would likely have some impact on
jurors whether the trial was held within or outside Los Angeles. Where
widespread publicity makes it unlikely to find a "sanitary" venue, the court
should stress the role of voir dire in finding a jury that meets the criterion of
practical impartiality. In such a case, the process works as well in any court in
the state. Indeed, the huge Los Angeles jury pool would have created a better
opportunity to find a jury of practical impartiality. It is preferable in this kind
of case to have the trial in the county of original venue. Trusting the people of
the vicinage is an important strand of the value of localism.
Another more political aspect of localism recognizes that some cases should
remain in the locality because local political issues are raised. The
court-hegemonic approach to venue has tended to view jurors more as
inconvenient appendages to the judicial process and less as citizens called on
to decide cases from the perspective of community norms. But if the value of
257 Madison

proposed a narrow vicinage as an amendment to Art. I using the term

"vicinage."Madison Resolution of8 June 1989, in HELENE.

VEIT,ETAL., CREATING THE BILL
OF RIGHTS: THE DOCUMENTARY RECORD FROM THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS 13 (1991).

Senate opposition came from anti-Federalists who apparently wanted a narrower
vicinage limited to the county of the crime and a larger group who wanted greater

flexibility in ascertaining the vicinage. The wording of the Sixth Amendment ("which
district shall have been previously ascertained by law") is evidence of a compromise
that did not accord with anti-Federalist ideology. Id. at 296-97; Heller supra note 9, at 93.
We would also suggest that at the time of the Constitution's ratification, juries
loomed larger in the calculation of political actors as a protection against tyrannous
government than later. This was due in part to the active role of juries in seditious libel
cases in America and England. Stimson,supra note 27, at 51-59; THOMAS ANDREW GREEN,
VERDICTACCORDINGTOCONSCIENCE: PERSPECTIVES ON THE ENGLISH CRIMINAL TRIAL JURY,

1200-1800 318-55 (1985). In this light, a related cause for the decline in the jury's political
station was the development of the two party system later in the 1790s, which began
the process of making vocal opposition to the regime in power safer and legitimate,
SEYMOUR LIPSET, THE FIRST NEW NATION 42-51 (1963).

In any event, the elimination of change of venue is not possible under Groppi v.
Wisconsin, 400 U.S. 505 (1971).
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vicinage means anything, it includes the right of people in the locality to decide
hard questions of fact and, through the play of community norms, of law and
policy. The court of appeals was too quick to move the case rather than to trust
the good sense of the local jury and of the trial process to produce a fair and a
correct result. The trial of the four police officers should have been conducted
in Los Angeles, in the district where the crime was committed. 258 After all, the
nation's framers had the example of a local jury acquitting the British soldiers
2 59
in the Boston Massacre case, at a time of political tension.
The strongest general argument for localism has been made by Drew
Kershen. The Bill of Rights' ratifiers appreciated that a local jury, even if
instructed on the law, would apply it with a local flavor, so that the effective
rules of law might differ from one locale to another.260 This democratic and
decentralized perspective allowed citizens to establish community standards.
After more than a century of courts paring down the legitimate jury role in
deciding or even shaping issues of law, does localism continue to have any
value? 261 Kershen emphatically believes so:
Because the verdict they will render will affect their own community,
not another, the jurors of the vicinage will likely feel an obligation to
articulate as accurately and conscientiously as possible the sense of
justice of the community. Moreover, because the jury of the vicinage
represents its own community, the community as a whole, and in
particular cases the members of the jury who make up the jury of the
vicinage, will realize they have only themselves to praise or blame for
the sense of justice reflected in the verdicts of the juries of the vicinage.
By contrast, using jurors from a community unrelated to the crime
poses significant dangers that those jurors will not sufficiently feel the
desired sense of obligation for the verdict rendered because the verdict
will not affect their own community. At the same time, even if the jurors
from a community unrelated to a crime do act as conscientiously as
possible in reaching a verdict, the community where the crime was
committed would be unable to feel responsible for the verdict. If the
verdict reached by the jury from the community unrelated to the crime
was a praiseworthy verdict, the community where the crime was
committed could not claim the praise. If the verdict reached by the jury
from the community unrelated to the crime was a condemnable
verdict, the community where the crime was committed could avoid
258

Given that established rules in Los Angeles divided the city into eleven judicial
districts, see supra note 211, it is entirely possible that a case like that of Rodney King
would be tried wherever the auto chase ended, whether a wealthy enclave or a
poverty-stricken area.
259
CATHERINE DRINKER BOWEN, JOHN ADAMS AND THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 355-405

(1950).
260 Kershen, supra note 9, at 833-40.
261 See supra notes 27-33 and accompanying text.
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the blame. Under the tenets of democratic responsibility, a community
ought to be permitted to take the praise, and conversely, ought not to
be permitted to avoid the blame, for the standards required of the
community as articulated in verdicts concerning crimes committed in
that community. Today, as in 1789, a jury of the vicinage best preserves
262
the jury as a democratic institution in the administration of justice.
These words apply precisely to Powell. Ventura County was allowed, even
forced, to make law for the governance of Los Angeles. Ventura County,
speaking through its jury, told the police in Los Angeles, or at least told white
officers, that it is not criminal for them to beat African-American suspects. 263
In Kershen's terms, the effect of the case was to saddle Ventura county with the
opprobrium of a condemnable verdict and to strip Los Angeles county of an
element of self-rule. Perhaps the court didn't see it this way, but only saw
county lines as administrative artifacts. People today, however, often are
acutely aware of the county-community relationship, especially in
264
metropolitan areas with high degrees of black-white residential segregation.
The public certainly made a distinction between the jury in Simi Valley and one
that could have been empaneled in Los Angeles in the comments following the
acquittal.
The criticism of the court of appeals in this article is not meant to suggest
that local political controversy can never be a reason for changing venue. Our
argument is based on the idea that in cases of nationwide political impact,
including the "Rodney King" case, a change of venue makes no sense. There
were, as Powell demonstrated, high political concerns raised by the case,
especially in Los Angeles. But it is argued that the court was too quick to move
the case in advance of an attempt to empanel a jury, failed to take national
publicity and political salience into account, and did not credit the value of
localism in the venue decision.
The value of localism directs the court to keep the case in the jurisdiction of
original venue whenever possible, especially when a case is of high local political
concern. In the anti-polygamy cases, for example, Congress tried to gain
ascendancy over the Mormons by eliminating polygamists and those favoring

262

Kershen, supra note 9, at 84-8.
263Ventura County prides itself on what it is not. First and foremost, it
is not Los Angeles... Collars are overwhelmingly white-as is the
population... The 1980 census counted 2,000 active law enforcement
officers in Simi Valley and neighboring Thousand Oaks. "Iwould much
rather try a brutality case in Ventura than in L.A. with an L.A. jury," said
attorney Alan Wisotsky, a former Los Angeles police officer who now
defends police officers in so-called "excessive-force" cases. 'Here, police go
into the trial with the advantage of being viewed as trustworthy, and it's
up to the adversary to prove otherwise."
Betsy Streisand, A Nice, Safe Place to Live, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Feb. 10, 1992, at

18.
264

See supranote 186 and accompanying text.
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polygamy from the jury.265 Consider the questionable possibility of the United
States government having attempted to move those cases to Washington, D.C.
for trial. 266 To have done so would have been overt political manipulation of
the jury in order to obtain a verdict desired by the government, in imitation of
British action before the Revolution. It seems to us that under the guise of
perfect impartiality, the Powell court subliminally achieved a political result
while convincing itself that it acted under a domain of pure legality. In the
examples of the British pre-Revolutionary trials and in the Mormon cases,
political results were achieved directly and with the intended effect in sight. In
Powell a political effect, perhaps not the one intended by the court, was
nevertheless achieved, as moving the case from Los Angeles was likely to
produce a differently conditioned jury.While the Powell court does not deserve
opprobrium for this, its opinion should not be beyond evaluation for its
possible effects. At the very least, then, the locality should be given the
opportunity to seat a jury before the conclusion is drawn that a jury with
2 67
practical impartiality cannot be found.
Significantly, since Irvin, Rideau, and Sheppard,268 trial courts have taken
effective steps to control pre-trial publicity by never again allowing the "circus
like" atmosphere of those cases. The courts have thus attempted indirectly to
influence the press to behave responsibly. There was a limit to a court's ability
to control publicity, and these limits were recognized in these cases. The
Supreme Court's publicity cases directed American trial courts to control those
elements of publicity that were within a court's ability to control. The cases did
not intend the suppression of all publicity nor did they rule that extensive
269
publicity alone required the dismissal of prosecutions.

265

See supranote 207.

266

Compare the British practice before the Revolutionary War, supra note 9.
This proposal does not conflict with the California practice of allowing pretrial
review of the venue issue. See Powell v. Superior Court, 283 Cal. Rptr. 777, 781-82 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1991). It would add some burden on attorneys to take pretrial appeals for
change of venue at the point where empaneling a jury fails. This is a price worth paying
to insure that the locality receives an opportunity to empanel a jury of practical
impartiality. Id.
Under federal law the defendant must sustain the claim that a jury is partial, by
demonstrating this in reference to the voir dire. United States v. Haldeman, 559 F.2d 31,
60 (D.C. Cir. 1976). See also People v. Smith, 468 N.E.2d 879 (N.Y. 1984), cert. denied sub
nom. New York v. Smith, 469 U.S. 1227 (1985); People v Boudin, 451 N.Y.S.2d 153 (2d
App. Div. 1982).
267

268

See supranotes 15-23 and accompanying text.
This is the interpretation put on these cases in the Watergate appeal. United States
v. Haldeman, 559 F.2d 31, 60-1 (D.C. Cir. 1976). Thus, it was noted that the televised
confession in Rideau was staged by the police, that the decision in Irvin was not based
only on the extent of pretrial publicity but on an evaluation of the voir dire testimony
that showed that community prejudice had in fact "invaded the jury box," and that the
trial court in Sheppard failed to insulate the jury from the effects of publicity during the
trial.
269
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By analogy, the Powell court may have reacted to a feared loss of control. The
situation in Los Angeles after Rodney King's beating came to light included
heated political rhetoric and threats of violence if the case was transferred. The
Powell court, operating under the juristic ideal of Maine, that "[p]olitical factors
have no place in a criminal proceeding, and when they are likely to appear, as
here, they constitute an independent reason for a venue change, 2 70 may have
felt compelled to change venue or be held responsible for allowing the situation
to get out of hand, as it had in the trio of federal cases. A court operating in the
context of hegemonic control assumed by the venue cases simply could not
tolerate the threat to legal quietus by anything as messy as local political
passions. 271 This is implied in the court's conclusion:
While we recognize that the incident and some of its ramifications
have received widespread publicity elsewhere, the impact on residents
of Los Angeles is unquestionably much greater because of the
unabated and acrimonious total involvement of city officials and local
community leaders. There is no doubt that these political biases would
272
invade the jury box if the case were tried in Los Angeles County.
Accordingly, Powell heroically and futilely attempted to keep "politics" out of
the trial, by controlling that which was beyond the court's ability to control. It
was as impossible in Powell to keep politics out as it was in the Watergate or
Robert Kennedy assassination cases. The court failed to recognize limits
inherent in the Maine rule, which if taken to its logical conclusion, would
immunize defendants in cases as politically charged as Powell.
B. The Implications of Localism
A complete analysis of criminal venue requires a recognition and analysis of
competing interests. There are times, and the Powell case was one, where the
standard formula of practical impartiality does not fit and consideration must
be given to other values. By adhering to a constricted standard when
circumstances called for more, the court of appeals applied California's venue
rules while wearing blinders. It stressed the professional concern for
impartiality to the total exclusion of the "political" element of vicinage interests.
Indeed, citing Maine it fled in horror from any taint of political considerations
in making a ruling.2 73
The irony is apparent. In Powell, a case dripping with politics, the attempt to
flee from its political impact on the minds of potential Los Angeles jurors only
moved the case to a place where a different set of political considerations
270

Maine v. Superior Court, 438 P.2d 372, 380 (Cal. 1968).

271

See supra note 200 and accompanying text.

2 72

Powell v. Superior Court, 283 Cal. Rptr. 777, 787 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991).

2 73

"Political factors have no place in a criminal proceeding, and when they are likely
to appear, as here, they constitute an independent reason for a venue change." Maine,
438 P.2d at 380.
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influenced jurors. As discussed above, in this case the notion of impartiality
ceased to have the meaning conventionally assigned to it by change of venue
law. The stereotypical venue change situation did not exist in Powell, and the
court's error was to apply a rule to an inapt situation.
It would be ideal to offer an econometric formula that gave courts in every
instance the right answer to vexing problems of venue. This, of course, is a
"will-o'-the-wisp," and commentators who view the totality of judging
exclusively in terms of craft are of no help in the real world of passion and
politics that at times intrude in the courtroom. 274 Judges, as Edward Levi noted,
are rulers2 75 and must at times be called on to act with statesmanlike
perceptiveness and courage. It would no doubt have taken an act of courage
for the court to let venue lie in Los Angeles. The impartiality argument would
have been tossed about in the news media and, were the officers convicted,
would surely have been a basis for appeal.
Yet it seems, even without the benefit of hindsight of the acquittals' appalling
aftermath, that the decision in Powell was unwise from a "calculating"
perspective. Assume, arguendo, that the court of appeals panel took a
Machiavellian approach and asked what the consequences of their decision
would be.2 76 There are four possibilities represented in the following table.
The top line in each cell indicates whether a riot by outraged and
disenfranchised blacks in the context of Los Angeles' racial makeup could have
been expected or would be seen as in any way justified by observers. The
second line (LA) assumes what the opinion of African-Americans in Los
VENUE

Los Angeles
1

Amugi_

No justification
for riot

Riots (Powell case)

LA: Upset, confused

LA:

OUT: Confused,
congratulatory

VERDICT

LA: Justice
OUT: Justice, some
"political'
doubts

Outrage

OUT: Confused,
angry
4

3
No riot

Convict

Not Los Angeles
2

No riot

LA: Justice,
congratulatory
OUT: Justice,
congratulatory

274 jAMES EDWARD BOND, THE ART OF JUDGING (1987).
275

EDWARD H. LEVi, AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING 6 (1949).

276The court addressed
the prudential concern of possible violence in the aftermath
of an acquittal; see supra notes 198-200 and accompanying text.
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Angeles might have been and the third line (OUT) guesses at the possible
opinion of whites holding average opinions 277 outside of Los Angeles.
In cell #1 (acquittal in Los Angeles), any actual or threatened riot would have
been tempered by the knowledge that there was less justification to do so, as
the jury would have included blacks and would have been seen to be a jury of
peers of the affected community. While riots may have occurred, the political
meaning attached to them would be different. It would have been more difficult
if not impossible for political leaders to shift the blame for the riots to white
America and use the events as a lever for policy advantage. Given the impact
of the tapes on virtually every television watcher, an acquittal would have
produced some confusion in white America, which, given the universal
editorial condemnation of the L.A.P.D., 278 expected a guilty verdict. But a
sizeable portion of public opinion would likely have applauded the remarkable
fairness of the L.A. jury to set aside any latent prejudices and evaluate the case
on its merits. As in the Simi Valley case (cell #2, acquittal outside Los Angeles),
opinion may also have noted the excellent reputation of defense counsel and
the weak record of Ira Reiner, the elected District Attorney.2 79 If the same trial
prosecutor were used, some of the blame for an "incorrect" verdict may have
fallen on his inexperience and errors in handling the case. 280
Cell #2 is our assessment of black and white opinion following the riots. It
seems naive of the court of appeals to have believed that removing the case
would preclude riots in this era of instantaneous mass media, even were the
case not held closer to the site of Rodney King's beating than the central Los
Angeles courthouse. 281 The court nevertheless based its opinion on the legal
fiction of perfect impartiality.
In cells #3 and #4 (conviction in and outside of Los Angeles, respectively) no
riots could be anticipated. Blacks in Los Angeles would have concluded that
convictions were justified and would have congratulated a jury outside Los
Angeles for not succumbing to racism. Likewise, white America would have
recognized the justice of a Los Angeles conviction, mixed perhaps with some
questions as to whether the Los Angeles jury acted purely on the basis of the
facts and law or was influenced in part by "political" considerations.

2 77

See supra notes 173-89 and accompanying text.

2 78

See supra notes 123-25.

2 79

Loss Likely to Affect Election, Los ANGELES DAILY JOURNAL, April 30, 1992, at 1, col.

6. (L.A. District Attorney's office had "suffered a string of bitter defeats in high publicity
criminal cases."). Matt Lait, 2 'Formidable'Lawyers Take Officer's Case in King Beating, Los
ANGELES TIMES, February 9, 1992, at B1, col. 5.
28

0Peter Arenella, Dissecting the King Verdict: Prosecutor's Mistakes, Jurors'
Subconscious Racism, Led to Acquittals, Los ANGELE DAILY JOURNAL, May 7, 1992, col. 3,
at 6.
281

Petitioner's Brief at 4, Petition for Writ of Prohibition or in the Alternative Writ of
Mandate; Request for Stay of Trial at 4, Powell v. Superior Court of California, County
of Los Angeles, (LASC BA 035498) (Powell II).
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This is what the jury is supposed to do: balance the judge's instructions on
the law and the facts presented during trial with their own understanding of
community values. A Washington, D.C. lawyer serving on a criminal jury some
months after the Los Angeles beating case noted the impossibility of keeping
community values out of an ordinary prosecution. 282 Three elements enter into
the jury equation: facts, law, and community values. If the last element is
deemed totally illegitimate by courts which act to exclude community values
entirely, as the court of appeals did in Powell, then the argument for the
continuation of the criminal jury is weakened. Certainly, a better
verdict-spewing computer than the jury can be found.
A fear of the intrusion of community values into the judging process has
always been that the "wrong" values would intrude. The argument for
considering localism means that a notorious case of a black motorist beaten by
white police in a white suburban enclave, like Ventura County, would indeed
be tried by a "Simi Valley jury" if a jury of practical impartiality can be
empaneled. A white suburban motorist beaten by black police officers in
Atlanta would be tried by an Atlanta jury. An Asian motorist from Lowell,
Massachusetts beaten by Latino police officers in Miami, Florida would be tried
by a Miami jury. The position is that barring the proven impossibility of
securing a jury of practical impartiality upon voir dire, this solution, that allows
a level of community consciousness into the jury's decision, is a preferable
solution to the venue issue than other formulae.
A concept that arose in Powell, the implementation of which was attempted
in Lozano, 283 was to move the trial to a venue that matched the racial makeup
of the county of original venue. In the aftermath of Powell state legislatures have
proposed instituting this "solution"by statute. Courts have also recently begun
to consider moving notorious cases from the county of original venue to
another city in the state with a similar ethnic makeup. The bizarre fate of

What soon became apparent was that much of the law went out the
window... One woman expressed concerns about Martin with a gun on
the streets and her daughter needing to live in a safe community ....
There seemed to be a direct correlation between a juror's personal
experience with the police and the weight he or she gave to the testimony
of the law enforcement officials. The jurors who had only pleasant encounters with the police assumed that the testimony of the policemen was the
absolute truth and should be given more weight than witnesses for the
defense. Those who had been wrongly accused by the police of criminal
conduct or who empathized with the plight of Rodney King in Los
Angeles questioned the credibility of the police's testimony.
Our discussions at times veered off into larger societal issues. One juror
stated that we need to get "these people" off the streets. Another said she
felt that because the police had such a difficult job they could not be expected to follow every technical legal procedure.
Robert A. Robertson (Letter), View From the Jury Box, WASHINGTON POST, Oct. 20, 1991,
at C8.
282

283

Lozano v. State, 584 So. 2d 19, 23 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
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Florida's Lozano case, which has become an embarrassing legal-political
football, is an indication of how the application of stereotypical change of
venue rules in unusual cases can lead to absurd results. 284 The reported
284

1n January, 1989, William Lozano, a Colombian born Miami police officer shot and
killed a black motorcyclist in the Overtown ghetto of Miami on the eve of Martin Luther
King, Jr. holiday. Riots erupted. Lozano was convicted of manslaughter in December,
1989. In June, 1991, the conviction was overturned on the ground that the defendant's
change of venue motion should have been considered. Lozano v. State, 584 So. 2d 19,
23 (Fla. Dist. App. 1991). The Florida Court of Appeals issued a vague order on remand:
Although we find that the circumstances at the time of trial were such that
the trial court erred in not granting a change of venue at that point, we
do not mandate a transfer of venue after remand. Instead, that question
will be resolved below, after hearing, on the basis of the conditions existing
at the time of any such motion.

Id.

An unseemly spectacle arose. 'It is a trial that no city in Florida wants to hold, a
political football that has already bounced from Miami to Orlando to Tallahassee, back
to Orlando, and that's not the end of it." Larry Rohter, Retrial of Miami PolicemanCould
Test Judiciaryon Race, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 15, 1992, at 1. After a prosecution appeal failed,
CircuitJudge Thomas Spencer ruled that the trial must be moved out of Miami because
of pretrial publicitybut did not indicate where it would be held. JudgeMoves Lozano Trial
Out ofMiami, UPI, Apr. 2,1992, availablein LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI File. The case was
then shifted to Orlando under orders of an appeals judge. The percentage of blacks in
Orlando was 10.1 percent. In May, 1992, after the Los Angeles riots, Judge Spencer,
apparently on his own motion with no input from counsel, took the unusual step of
shifting the venue to Tallahassee, where the African-American proportion of the
population approximates Miami's of 20%. This in turn, brought criticism from Lozano's
lawyer who argued that less than three percent of the Tallahassee population is
Hispanic.
Early in August, Circuit Judge William Gary of Tallahassee moved the case back to
Orlando on the ground that due process was violated when proper legal process was
not followed by Judge Spencer. Lozano's attorney called for the case to be returned to
Miami. Mike Clary, A Case No One Wants Is Still ShoppingForA Courtroom,Los ANGELES

TIMES, Aug. 1, 1992, at A23. This was followed by a cryptic order by Judge Spencer
moving the case back to Tallahassee, at first giving no reason, thereby giving the State
the opportunity to appeal. Larry Rohter, Move Advised in Retrial ofEx-Miami Officer, N.Y.

TIMES, Aug. 18, 1992, A9.
Following these gyrations the Florida Supreme Court, in November 1992, on a
mandamus petition by the State, ruled that Judge Spenser was the original trial judge
and that Judge Gary, the successor judge "had only limited authority to issue orders
inconsistent with his predecessor's rulings." State v. Gary, 609 So.2d 1291, 1293 (Fla.
1992). Once venue is transferred, barring extraordinary circumstances, it is subject only
to appellate review. But this ruling seems to be geared largely to an attempt to preserve
the appearance of justice. "[Tihe interests of justice require a rule designed to inhibit trial
courts from engaging in a 'ping-pong game' by transferring a case back and forth,
thereby jeopardizing the rights of parties and undermining public confidence in the
judicial function." Gary, 609 So.2d at 1294. Thus, the Florida Supreme Court did nothave
a principled view of venue law uppermost in its mind in making this ruling. But the
venue "ping-pong game" did not end with the Supreme Court's transfer of the case back
to Tallahassee.
On the eve of the voir dire in Tallahassee in March, 1993, the prosecution petitioned
the court of appeals for a writ of certiorari to review the venue transfer. The appellate
court stretched its normal procedures to grant the writ, characterizing the Lozano case
as unique, and thus transferring the case back to Orlando. State v. Lozano, 616 So.2d 73,
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accounts of Lozano's search for a venue have clearly damaged the repute of
Florida's judicial system as the political nature of the case's odyssey was
exposed. 285 In this situation, the courts must establish a principled basis for

decisions, and this has been found wanting when stereotypical change of venue
rules are applied to unusual circumstances. The legal contortions that go into
finding a comparable venue miss the constitutional point about trials in
sensitive and notorious cases. The Constitution does not require courts to

engage in exercises of applied sociology to niatch the demographics of the
county of original venue with another location. Decisions concerning venue
and vicinage are fundamentally political: as long as there are states and
counties in the United States the fundamental meaning of the jury system is

75 (Fla Dist. Ct. App. 1993). The court of appeals noted that both the prosecutor and the
defense believed that the transfer of venue to Tallahassee violated Lozano's rights. The
prosecution was sure that a conviction of Lozano in that city would bring another appeal
on change of venue grounds. Judge Spencer's Order of May 6,1992, moving the case to
Tallahassee, which was appended to the court of appeal's opinion, took into
consideration only the victim's race and not that of the defendant. The move to
Tallahassee "virtually guaranteed the absence of Hispanic jurors," Lozano, 616 So. 2d at
76, constituting, in the court's opinion, a clear violation of Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S.
79, 86 (1986): "Purposeful racial discrimination in selection of the venire violates a
defendant's right to equal protection because it denies him the protection that a trial by
jury is intended to secure."
As a result of this ruling the case was transferred back to Orlando, the fifth move in
a year, and a mixed jury of two Hispanic members, three whites and one black, four
women and two men, was empaneled. Larry Rohter, Mixed Jury Picked to Try Policeman,
N.Y. TIMES, May 15,1993, § 1, at 6. Lozano was acquitted. The acquittal may have been
the result of several different factors. Roy Black, Lozano's celebrated attorney switched
trial strategy. Instead of presenting a defense, he based his strategy on showing that the
prosecution failed to prove its case. But the change of venue certainly played a role.
While it is true that the racial composition of the jury was mixed, as was the case in the
Miami jury that originally convicted Lozano in 1989, Orlando had a "reputation as a
bastion of law-and-order sentiment, a city whose residents regard Miami and
surrounding Dade County as a violent and alien place." Larry Rohter, Miami Police
Officer Is Acquitted In Racially Charged Slaying Case, N.Y. TIMES, May 29, 1993, § 1, at 1.
The Lozano "saga" supports our view that a jury that earnestly discharges its
responsibility to review the facts of the case will nevertheless inevitably bring
community sentiment into the jury room. It demonstrates the futility of trying to find a
city that "matches" the racial makeup of the original venue, even if one were to accept
the controversial thesis behind Judge Spencer's order that "minority groups need to be
represented on the jury in proportion to their presence in the population." Larry Rohter,
Lozano Case Tests How Racially Balanceda Jury Must Be, N.Y. TIMES, May 16, 1993, § 4, at
3.
28 5
"D. Marvin Jones, a professor of law at the University of Miami, agrees the Lozano
case has been compromised by politics." Clary, supra note 284 at A23, col. 1. Also, while
attorneys take the rhetorical high road on this issue, their actions can be expected to
protect their clients' interests. Lozano's attorney, for example, argued for the case to be
moved to Orlando because of publicity in Miami, but was against moving the case to
Tallahassee. Orange County (Orlando) was the venue where Lozano's police partner
was acquitted of perjury in relation to the case, and was described by a Florida
sociologist as "'the most reactionary, most pro-police county in the State of Florida."'
Rohter, supra note 284.

https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol41/iss2/4

62

1993]

RETHINKING VENUE

political in a constitutional sense. The framers' intents, both in the federal and
in state constitutions, was to leave a residue of local political controlin the hands
of local citizens. Local control can and should be overridden in cases where
local prejudice clearly undermines a fair trial and feasible alternatives to a
prejudiced jury panel exist. Butina case like Powell a constitutional choice must
be made and the only constitutionally correct decision would be to leave venue
in the county of original jurisdiction. In the Powell situation we have argued
that the court should have relied on Manson to arrive at this decision. If,
however, the decision is seen as legally determined by the strictures of the
California Penal Code,2 8 6 then we recommend that California model its statute
on open-ended venue provisions in other states.28 7 A law that enjoins courts to
seek a "comparable" jurisdiction is likely to raise far more problems than it
solves. Such a law would emphasize the value of race-consciousness, with all
the problems that are created in criminal law by relying on that value.
To argue that such calculations have no place in a judicial decision is to be
blind to the myriad ways in which courts mix considerations of principle and
prudence in their decisions. Drew Kershen's statement about a community
taking credit or reaping blame for praiseworthy or condemnable verdicts, so
seemingly abstract, has come home to roost in the Rodney King case. The
verdict in Simi Valley has added real tension to the malignant state of race
relations in America by substituting the judgment of an outside community for
the one saddled with its consequences. Los Angeles residents should have been
allowed to have a hand in deciding a case that would mark its place in national
esteem and affect the temper of its race relations. Deciding when a notorious
case should remain in the county of original venue will surely require the
exercise of finely honed political as well as legal insight on the part of judges.
It seems to us that courts are well suited to take into account matters of political
structure and atmosphere, as factual issues, in making such venue decisions.
The underlying problem with Powell was its view of the jury as a chaste
instrument of "blind justice" and as the court's appendage. The legal
community must begin to treat the criminal jury with greater respect as a
political institution. To do so, the jury as a fact-finding device must be balanced
against a valid concept of the jury as a political manifestation of the local
community. The lip-service given by courts to the jury as the conscience of the
community must be transformed into renewed deference to this vital
institution of democracy. And that can best be done by leaving venue where
our constitutional scheme assumes it will be in difficult cases, in the county of
original venue.

286

See supra notes 39-41 and accompanying text.
See supra note 39. A statute that avoids the traditional verbiage of determining if
prejudice in the county of original venue would prevent a fair trial ineffectdirects judges
to engage in a comparative analysis of publicity and other factors in the county of
original venue and in other jurisdictions throughout the state.
287
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